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The use of authorial marks in relation to the sale of creative works, like the
use of business trademarks in relation to the sale of goods and services,
creates social benefits that deserve legal protection. Authorial attribution acts
as an incentive to authorial production, provides valuable information to
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consumers, and provides additional social benefits that go beyond issues of
market efficiency. However, the use of authorial marks, like the use of
trademarks, can create social harms. Just as counterfeiters place illegitimate
trademarks on goods, exploiters of entertainment markets may be tempted to
misattribute authorship. In the United States, such deceptive practices were
traditionally subject to the remedial mechanisms of trademark and unfair
competition laws. However, in a 2003 decision, Dastar Corporation v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, the United States Supreme Court
held that federal trademark law does not address the misattribution of
authorship. The Dastar decision stated that trademark protections were
designed to protect the creators of tangible products sold in the marketplace.
The Court stated that trademark law was not designed to protect the interests
of those who originate creative ideas or communications.
This article explores society’s interests in ascertaining the authorship of
creative works and explains how those interests both resemble and diverge
from standard trademark interests. It concludes that as authorship marks are
sufficiently analogous to trademarks, the Dastar approach is misguided.
Consumers can and should be protected from misattributions of authorship
where such misattributions can easily be remedied by law and where the
failure to provide such remedies is likely to lead to significant consumer
harms.
INTRODUCTION
A good name is better than precious ointment. 1
The earliest known paintings in existence, the wall paintings in the cave of
Chauvet, are marked with what seem to be the handprint signatures of the
artists who created them over 30,000 years ago.2 The intended meaning of
these handprints is not clear, but they function to fuse an aspect of the artist’s
physical identity with the surface of the medium. In essence, they are
signatures. Literary signature, which fuses a mark of authorial identity with a
text, also has ancient roots. The earliest literary author to sign her name to a
work was the ancient Mesopotamian high priestess Enheduanna, who wrote
1 Ecclesiastes 7:1 (King James). See also Scott Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc.,
589 F.2d 1225, 1227 (3d Cir. 1978) (“In his classic ‘Essay on Walking,’ Thoreau expressed
the notion that there is nothing in a name. This view has been vigorously rejected by both
parties to this [trademark] litigation, not to mention almost all of mankind to whom a name
is an important means of identification.”) (citing Ecclesiastes).
2 Corey Field, Copyright, Technology, and Time: Perspectives on “Interactive” as a
Term of Art in Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 49, 52 (2003). The
handprints were created by blowing pigment over the hand held against the rock surface,
creating a “negative” print of the hand. Field leads his article with a photograph of the
handprints, but he frames the handprints as a proto-copyright assertion of ownership, not
signature. Id.
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poems circa 2300 B.C.3 Centuries later, a version of the Sumerian Epic of
Gilgamesh was attributed to the scribe Sin-Leqi-Unninni.4 The practice of
artistic signature persists today. It is neither a recent nor an exclusively
Western phenomenon.5 Even where works are not signed by artists, one might
argue that all artistic works are intimately bound up with the artist’s identity,
making the work itself a form of personal signature.6 Works of artistic
production generally bear traces that may betray the true identity of the
creator.7 In various small details, authors leave unconscious “fingerprints” on
their works that, like handwriting, reveal their personal involvement with the
creation.8 Just as an actor’s facial expressions, style of walking, or manner of
speech may be unconsidered yet potentially expressive, so an artist’s efforts at
self-expression are at least partially governed by unconscious mannerisms.9
And obviously, there are some conscious mannerisms that appear in authorial
styles – certain skills, themes, interests, and ideologies are reliably associated
with particular authors. It should be no surprise that computer-aided
algorithmic analysis of handwriting, paint-strokes, and word usage can be used
3

ENHEDUANNA, INANNA, LADY OF LARGEST HEART: POEMS OF THE SUMERIAN HIGH
PRIESTESS ENHEDUANNA (Betty De Shong Meador ed. & trans., 2001).
4 SIN-LEQI-UNNINNI, GILGAMESH: TRANSLATED FROM THE SIN-LEQI-UNNINNI VERSION
(John Gardner et al., trans. 1985). Sin-Leqi-Unninni’s attributed version was merely a retelling of the much older Gilgamesh story – it would be called a derivative work in the
parlance of copyright law.
5 Cf. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the
Crossfire Between Copyright and Section 43(a), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985, 985 (2002) (“The
right of attribution recognizes a fundamental truth about human nature.”).
6
See Paul Edward Geller, Toward an Overriding Norm in Copyright: Sign Wealth,
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR, Jan. 1994, at 3, 21 (“Romantic critics
[believed that] by virtue of the creative act . . . authors would necessarily leave the marks of
their unique personalities on their works.”).
7 This is not to say that creating such traces is always a goal of artistic production. For
instance, those who engage in artistic forgery seek essentially to replicate the known identity
traces of another. See GIORGIO VASARI, THE LIVES OF THE ARTISTS 418, 423-24 (Julia
Conaway Bondanella & Peter Bondanella trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1549)
(recounting how Michelangelo forged old drawings so that he could return the forged copies
and retain the originals, and reporting the infamous sale of a forged ancient Cupid for a
seventy ducat premium). Also, it is impossible to speak categorically about “artists,” some
of whom make it a point to defy categorical claims about artistry. For instance, Michel
DuChamp and Jeff Koons have simply found objects and duplicated or recontextualized
them. See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 305 (2d Cir. 1992) (“In his ‘production
notes’ Koons stressed that he wanted ‘Puppies’ copied faithfully in the sculpture. For
example, he told his artisans the ‘work must be just like photo – features of photo must be
captured;’ later, ‘puppies need detail in fur. Details – Just Like Photo!’”).
8 Noah Schactman, Software Detects the True Artist, WIRED NEWS, Nov. 22, 2004,
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,65794,00.html (explaining how the
characteristics of an artist’s brush strokes can identify the artist).
9 See id.
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to explore the veracity of claims of authorship.10 Because society cares about
ascertaining authorship, experts who police the veracity of claimed authorship
attributions sometimes employ such techniques.11
But do the laws of intellectual property protect indicia of an author’s
identity? In a recent decision, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., the United States Supreme Court essentially answered “no.”12 The
Court in Dastar stated that trademark law does not protect against
misattributions of authorship because such protections would bring trademark
law into conflict with copyright law.13 Copyright law is generally understood
as the regulatory framework that speaks to artistic creation. Copyright law,
however, says very little about the attribution of authorship.14 Thus, shorn
from trademark law by Dastar and ignored by copyright, markings of
authorship are generally not protected by the two primarily federal laws of
intellectual property that would conceivably regulate such marks. This does
not mean that authorial markings are entirely beyond legal regulation. For
instance, authors may use copyright as a lever to demand attributions of
authorship.15 To some extent, authors may also seek protections against the
misuse of their names pursuant to rights of publicity (in states where such
protections exist). Consumers deceived by authorial misrepresentations may
still make claims of misrepresentation and fraud when they are harmed by false
designations of authorship.16 But these options create only a spotty, collateral
patchwork of protection. In the two places one might reasonably expect to see
markings of authorship regulated – the federal intellectual property laws of
trademark and copyright – the law is essentially silent.
This article argues that Congress should amend the Lanham Act to reject the
Dastar decision and once again apply trademark law to indications of
authorship.17 The article proceeds as follows: Part I argues that social benefits
10

Id. (describing how invisible pen and brush strokes in artistic works can be detected by
computer imaging and attributed to specific artists through algorithmic analyses).
11 Id. (chronicling a Dartmouth College team’s effort to verify the authenticity of a
painting). Admittedly, in the case of an artist like Koons, who essentially recontextualizes
works and sometimes employs others to do this, such techniques would likely prove
ineffective. See supra note 7.
12 539 U.S. 23, 36 (2003) (explaining that there is no legal recourse for complaints of
plagiarism).
13 Id. at 33.
14 See infra Part II.C.
15 See infra Part II.C.2.
16 See infra Part II.D.
17 Cf. Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and
Trademark Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263, 286-306 (2004) (suggesting that the Dastar decision
should be remedied by legislative action with regard to moral rights); Laura A. Heymann,
The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1377, 1378 (2005) (observing that trademark designations and authorial
attributions share common characteristics and arguing, from the standpoint of First
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from practices of accurate authorial attribution largely track the social benefits
provided by source attributions under trademark law. (By contrast, some
recent commentary on the Dastar case has focused primarily on how authors
benefit from attribution, discussing the “moral rights” of creators to claim
rights of attribution.18) Part II discusses Dastar and explains how theories of
trademark and copyright relate to interests in authorial attribution. Part III
differentiates social concerns over practices of plagiarism and ghostwriting
from issues raised by collaborative authorship. Part III proposes that
trademark law should regulate indicia of authorship, but that the scope of
authorial attribution protections under trademark law should be crafted as a
conservative, non-traditional form of trademark protection.
I.

AUTHORIAL ATTRIBUTION AND SOCIETY

In the room the women come and go
Talking of Michelangelo19
Why should trademark law speak at all to the issue of authorial attribution?
In answer to this question, I would like to put aside one argument and advance
three others. I would like to eschew the claim that trademark law should
protect against authorial misattribution because society owes such protection to
authors as an ethical, legal, or political imperative. In other words, I am not
advocating here for a stripe of authorial “moral rights” protections in response
to the Dastar decision.20 This article does not oppose such arguments.21

Amendment law and literary theory, that the law must recognize “the essential
pseudonymity of all statements of authorship”).
18 See Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 265 (“Reputation is critical to a person who follows a
vocation dependent on commissions from a variety of clients. Success breeds success, but
only if the first success is known to potential clients.”); David Nimmer, The Moral
Imperative Against Academic Plagiarism (Without a Moral Right Against Reverse Passing
Off), 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 77 (2004) (“In sum, there is in the United States, and there
should continue to be, a moral right against passing off. As a general matter, by contrast,
the reverse should be limited to specialized settings, such as academe, where attribution lies
at the core of the raison d’etre for the creation of works.”); Justin Hughes, American Moral
Rights and the Dastar Decision 3 (Cardozo Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 96, 2004),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=618783 (understanding Dastar in the context of moral
rights and the Berne Convention).
19 T.S. ELIOT, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock, reprinted in T.S. ELIOT, THE
COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 1909-1950 3, 4 (1952).
20 The United States is required, by treaty, to protect such rights. See John T. Cross,
Giving Credit Where Credit Is Due: Revisiting the Doctrine of Reverse Passing Off in
Trademark Law, 72 WASH. L. REV. 709, 761-62 (1997) (discussing and critiquing U.S.
efforts to comply with the requirements of the Berne Convention); Ginsburg, supra note 17,
at 265 (“[T]he Berne Convention . . . requires that Member States protect other Members’
authors’ ‘right to claim authorship.’”); Kwall, supra note 5, at 1003 (discussing attempts to
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However, framing the authorial attribution question along these lines runs the
risk of casting attribution as a struggle between the rights and interests of
artists and the rights and interests of state and society. Attribution rights under
such an analysis become a zero-sum game in which authors and artists must
find some foothold (ethical, legal, or rhetorical) by which to obtain
entitlements from society that are currently lacking. However, if we focus on
the manner in which authorial attribution practices benefit society, we can
move beyond the standard tug-of-war.
Along those lines, I would like to make three brief observations with regard
to how the application of trademark to authorial attribution might benefit
society. The first two benefits align fairly well with the benefits commonly
associated with trademarks: facilitating the production of quality products and
reducing consumer search costs.22 A third argument is that accurate authorial
attribution benefits society because it is a type of information that has a special
social value.
A.

Attribution as Incentive

With regard to the first argument, it is clear that authorial attribution can
function much like a trademark interest. If artists seek riches, they must
compete for patrons, prizes, and the favor of the public. In order to win in this
competition, artists must attempt to ensure that their works are of high quality,
and that prospective consumers will associate their new works with their
established reputations. If artists can ensure attribution of their works, artists
producing better quality will gain public goodwill and reap the benefits of their
investments in producing works of higher quality.23 This recognition and
goodwill can lead to greater opportunities for employment and contractual
leverage. Authorial attribution is thus a mechanism for ensuring that greater
profits flow to those producing superior products.
But the incentive role of attribution is not merely financial, as generally
secure attribution rights using the Lanham Act).
21 Indeed, I generally agree with Jane Ginsburg, Roberta Kwall, and others who suggest
that copyright law needs to be more attuned to protecting the interests of authors, not simply
those who are currently benefiting from copyright entitlements. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg,
The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1092
(2003) (criticizing the work for hire paradigm that secures rights on a basis other than
authorship).
22 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268-73 (1987) (applying a comprehensive economic
model to many of the doctrines of trademark law in an attempt to understand its costs and
benefits); see also Barton Beebe, Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV.
621, 623-24 (2004) (identifying the Chicago School analysis as the dominant theory of
trademark protection).
23 See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on
the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 787 (2004) (“Sellers benefit because they can invest in
goodwill with the knowledge that others will not appropriate it.”).
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posited in the case of trademark protections.24 In the case of authorship, the
benefits reaped by artists from attribution are social and psychological as
well.25 In the past, these social and psychological benefits may have even been
the primary reward provided in return for artistic production – simply because
no other significant reward existed. A desire for the immortality of fame might
have played some part in the creative efforts made by Enheduanna, Sin-LeqiUnninni, and Homer. In the era of mass media and diffused corporate control
of trademarks, we do not often think of attribution as providing this kind of
benefit as an incentive to greater production. The legal academy generally
continues to regard copyright law’s financial incentives as the primary engine
driving creative production, even though there are many reasons to be
suspicious of this claim.26 When copyright law is viewed against the panorama
of artistic creativity throughout human history, it is revealed to be a very recent
legal ordering birthed by technological revolution, fueled in its expansion by
particular business models, and perhaps best explained as a means of providing
incentives to distribute works through technologies of reproduction.27 Indeed,
some have argued that copyright is primarily attuned to protecting the interests
of publishers, not the interests of authors as artists.28
Socially valuable artistic production obviously predated copyright’s birth in
the seventeenth century. Copyright was instituted, in a rather limited form,
more than a century after Michelangelo’s death.29 This is not to say that the

24

Cf. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 23, at 799 n.84 (noting that “[n]oneconomic
justifications for trademark law are rare”).
25 The strong allure of fame to artists does not require a lengthy footnote. Suffice it to
say that a popular movie, song, and television series about a school for young performing
artists was not entitled Profit. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L.J. 1, 1 n.1
(1997) (citing the television series Fame and the associated movie and song). Many
scholars have argued that the pursuit of fame motivates artistic creativity. See Cross, supra
note 20, at 764-66 (“[M]any artists are unique in that they want recognition for recognition’s
sake . . . . [F]ame itself provides part, or maybe even all, of the motivation for creative
activity.”); Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some
Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 167, 174 (2002).
26 Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV.
951, 991-92 (2005) (observing that copyright, ironically, is largely irrelevant to the
production of legal scholarship).
27 Id. at 979-985 (discussing the application of copyright law to various copying
technologies); F. Gregory Lastowka, Free Access and the Future of Copyright, 27 RUTGERS
COMP. & TECH. L.J. 293, 293-97 (2001) (describing modes of distribution and explaining
changes resulting from digital technology).
28 See Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 61 (2002).
29 See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970). Indeed, copyright
was extended to protect works of visual art only a little more than a century ago. EDWARD
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quest for fame and attribution was the only thing that drove Michelangelo’s
efforts – the motivations for his work were complex.30 As his artistic genius
and reputation grew, his personal profits grew in equal measure.31 Yet it is
interesting to note how Michelangelo’s desire for a perfect reputation, at
various points in his life, eclipsed his desire to increase his wealth.32 Giorgio
Vasari, a contemporary of Michelangelo, explained how Michelangelo
destroyed valuable works that he believed to be of inferior quality:
[H]e often abandoned his works, or rather ruined many of them . . . just
before his death he burned a large number of his own drawings, sketches,
and cartoons to prevent anyone from seeing the labours he endured or the
ways he tested his genius, for fear that he might seem less than
perfect . . . .33
Michelangelo could certainly have sold off these inferior drawings and
sketches in order to benefit himself or his friends. Instead, where his
reputational interests and financial interests appeared to diverge, he protected
his reputation.34 Some might lament the loss of those destroyed drawings, and
see Michelangelo’s pursuit of a perfect reputation as excessive. But the
paradox is that the reputation dynamic that drove Michelangelo to destroy his
work was also the dynamic that drove him to strive for perfection and to create
his most celebrated works. Michelangelo decided that only a certain quality of
artistic work would further his reputational interests, and it was this type of
work that he struggled to produce.35 If reputation and attribution played a part
in driving Michelangelo to create his celebrated works, society ultimately
benefited from accurate authorial attribution practices.36

SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 11-15 (2000); Paul Edward Geller,
Copyright History and the Future: What’s Culture Got to Do With It?, 47 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 215 (2000) (describing the origins of English copyright law in fifteenthcentury monopolies on printing).
30 GEORGE BULL, MICHELANGELO: LIFE, LETTERS, AND POETRY 28-73 (George Bull &
Peter Porter eds. & trans., 1987) (translating and updating Ascanio Condivi’s account).
31 Id.
32 Biographical accounts suggest that while Michelangelo was generally reclusive and
sometimes a bit miserly, he was very concerned with his artistic reputation. VASARI, supra
note 7. See also BULL, supra note 30, at 61-62 (translating Ascanio Condivi); DIANE
STANLEY, MICHELANGELO 24, 39 (2000) (detailing how Michelangelo was a perfectionist in
his work, but shunned riches). It is interesting to note that Michelangelo did not fix his
name to his works, and signed only the Pieta statue. However, he signed that work not on
the base, as was customary, but on the prominent ribbon that crosses the Virgin’s chest at
eye level. LAURIE ADAMS, ITALIAN RENAISSANCE ART 316 (2001).
33 VASARI, supra note 7, at 472.
34 Id. (describing how Michelangelo destroyed many of his own works).
35 Id.
36 See supra note 32.
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Attribution as Consumer Protection

A second argument for regulation of authorial attribution is also closely
related to the standard justifications for trademark regulation. Authorial
attribution furthers the interests of consumers by reducing the costs of
searching for creative content. As Mark Rose has noted, a mark of authorship
functions much like a trademark – it signals a certain predictable quality and
type of associated work.37
In the fiction sections of libraries and bookstores, books are generally
arranged alphabetically by the last names of their respective authors. The
names of these authors also appear on the covers and spines of the works,
sometimes encompassing the entire top half of a book’s cover.38 Indicia of
authorship must be conveying some form of valuable information to
consumers. If they were not, the existence of these bold statements of
authorship would be mysterious. For instance, other products for sale,
including those protected by other species of intellectual property laws, are not
generally emblazoned with the names of their creative originators and
inventors. Arthur Fry, the creative inventor of Post-it® notes, certainly
wouldn’t mind being credited with his invention.39 He surely would not object
if office supplies were sorted by his last name (i.e., under “F” for Fry).
Inventors like Fry likely share the same pride in their inventions that authors
possess in the novels they write. But to emblazon inventor names on items for
sale would probably strike us as absurd in the case of office products. Most of
us just don’t care who came up with the idea for the Post-it® note – the identity
of the creator is severable from the product.
Yet works of creative authorship are different. In the case of creative works,
indicia of authorship can provide special value to consumers. From a
consumer standpoint, particular authors are believed to be associated with
works possessing certain intrinsic qualities.40 For example, consumers are
likely to believe that all novels by the authors Tom Clancy and V.C. Andrews
possess certain distinctive qualities.
Like trademarks, these authorial
attributions enable consumers who are searching for particular types and

37 MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS 1 (1993) (commenting that an author is “a kind
of brand name, a recognizable sign that the cultural commodity will be of a certain kind and
quality”).
38 See, e.g., MICHAEL CRICHTON, CONGO (Avon Books 2003) (evidencing the importance
of an author’s name by displaying it as large as the title on the cover of a book).
39 Arthur Fry and a colleague were responsible for the invention of 3M’s Post-it® Notes.
See U.S. Patent No. 5,194, 299 (filed Dec. 31, 1986); Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander,
Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 331-32 (1992).
40 See ROSE, supra note 37; Cross, supra note 20, at 762 (“[T]he artist’s name provides
some indication of the quality of the work.”); Diana Elzey Pinover, The Rights of Authors,
Artists and Performers Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 38, 47
(1993) (acknowledging the converse proposition that an author’s early work, or poorer
quality work, may detract from the value of her name as a mark).
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qualities of products to find those products that they consider more
appealing.41 While authors’ names are not trademarks per se and not all
consumers value authorial indicia in all instances, author names can act very
much like trademarks by providing useful information to consumers selecting
among competing products.42
C.

Attribution as Value

While the prior two sections sought to justify the social value of authorial
attribution by appealing to incentive effects or utility in reducing consumer
search costs, there is another social value provided by attribution. Society has
expressed an entirely independent, somewhat sui generis interest in
demarcating and ascertaining authorship, unrelated to any instrumental and
utilitarian effects that authorial attribution may have on markets and
production.43 In other words, a correct authorial attribution is a thing of value
in itself.
To take the example of Michelangelo again, we can assume that the price of
a drawing by Michelangelo will be higher than the price of a work by other
artists who were his contemporaries. Are Michelangelo’s drawings of a better
quality? The answer is generally yes, but the interesting point to see here is
that a hypothetical drawing attributed to Michelangelo would be valued more
highly than a hypothetical work by one of his contemporaries even if the two
hypothetical works were identical.44 A lousy Michelangelo drawing is a
valuable chattel – more valuable than the same lousy drawing that isn’t
attributed to Michelangelo. Michelangelo’s attribution, therefore, does not
simply convey information about the value of the work to which the attribution
is attached. The attribution, to some extent, creates the value. 45
One might argue that the value of the object in this case stems simply from
the value of celebrity aura associated with a tangible artifact.46 Michelangelo’s

41

Cross, supra note 20, at 753-54 (positing that discovering the source of a product is a
quick way for a consumer to evaluate the product).
42 See infra Part II.A and Part III.
43 See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
44 Even Michelangelo’s attempted forgeries, if recognized as such, would likely
command a higher value today than they would were they authentic. See supra note 7.
45 This tracks roughly with another, much less venerable and less accepted vein in
trademark theory: the anti-dilution theories of trademark protection, codified in federal law
at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000). The general notion of these theories is that the law should
protect a trademark signifier’s value in itself, independent of its associative value which
stems from linking the mark with a particular associated quality of underlying goods or
services. See Beebe, supra note 22, at 684-87 (reviewing the anti-dilution theories as the
basis for trademark protection); Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark
Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927), reprinted in 60 TRADEMARK REP. 334, 336-38
(1970) (arguing that a trademark has value apart from the signification of a source).
46 See WALTER BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction
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celebrity could create similar value in paintbrushes and chisels that he
employed to create his works. Artifacts that are associated with any figure of
fame (say, Benjamin Franklin’s eyeglasses or a dress worn by Marilyn
Monroe47) often have a fetishistic or historical value to consumers that seems
strangely disproportionate to any detached measure of the object’s utility.48
But the value created by authorship is not limited to tangible fetishes – a
person who framed a supposed Michelangelo print might discount the value of
the reproduction if the original was subsequently determined to be a forgery.
The point here is that authorship matters to the public because it places a work
in a particular social context. Indeed, even when objects are not for sale and
artists and authors are long dead, society will often police issues of authorial
attribution for their own sake. Was De Doctrina Christiana the work of
Milton? Was Titus Andronicus the work of Shakespeare? We might ask why
these questions even matter – but we can’t deny that they do matter to many
people and that many intelligent people engage in vigorous debates over these
exact questions. In the case of Shakespeare, scholarly wrangling over
authorship rises to the level of a recognized field of academic research.49 This
type of social interest in attribution admittedly isn’t the rule for most artists and
authors, but neither is it all that rare. The scholar Kathryn Lindskoog, for
instance, devoted much of her life to exposing what she believed to be
misattribution marring the reputation of C.S. Lewis.50 The general point here

(1937), in ILLUMINATIONS 219, 223 (Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans., 1968) (1955)
(discussing how mechanical reproduction transformed the nature of artistic objects by
removing the aura of originality).
47 See, e.g., Brendan Walsh, Collecting Marilyn: Blonde Bombshell Inspires Local Man’s
$10,000 Search, CORPUS CHRISTI CALLER-TIMES (Tex.), Sept. 18, 2001, available at
http://www.caller2.com/2001/september/18/today/fea-livi/11808.html
(“At
Christie’s
auction house in 1999, a two-day auction of Monroe’s personal belongings netted more than
$13.4 million. The most expensive item, the dress Monroe wore when she sang ‘Happy
Birthday’ to President Kennedy in 1962, went for $1.26 million.”).
48 Cf. Margeret Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959 (1982)
(commenting how the primary value of certain objects may derive from notions of self and
personhood).
49 James D.A. Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37 AM.
UNIV. L. REV. 625, 627 (1988) (noting that “[t]here are some fifty-six claimants to
Shakespeare’s throne – some of whom are supposed to have worked alone, while others are
supposed to have collaborated in the most unlikely assemblies”); see also The Shakespeare
Fellowship, http://www.shakespearefellowship.org/index.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2005)
(collecting internet resources on the issue of Shakespearean authorship). Even law reviews
have recently joined the fray. See Thomas Regnier, Comment, Could Shakespeare Think
Like a Lawyer? How Inheritance Law Issues in Hamlet May Shed Light on the Authorship
Question, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 377, 377 (2002) (examining the use of legal terms in
Shakespeare’s works to ascertain the correct identity of the author).
50 Lindskoog had alleged that the Lewis estate has tampered with the canon, most
notably in the case of the posthumously published Lewis novel, The Dark Tower (1983), a
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is that accurate authorial attribution can be relevant to people other than the
authors of works. It can be relevant to society for reasons that cannot be
captured in terms of market efficiencies.
These broader social interests in ascertaining and denoting authorship
operate independently of the author, persist after the death of the author, and at
times fly in the face of the “moral rights” approach that focuses on protecting
the personal interests of the artist.51 George Maciunas is a good example.52
Maciunas was a twentieth-century modern artist who was ideologically
opposed to what he saw as the tradition of the self-absorbed, privileged,
bourgeoisie artist separated from the working class.53 He attempted to destroy
this division by forming a movement within which individual artistic
attributions (and copyright) would be forbidden. He demanded that all artists
in his revolutionary enterprise would produce under the name FLUXUS.54
Commentators today, however, routinely identify George Maciunas as the
artistic originator of the FLUXUS group, and point to the respective
involvements of John Cage, Yoko Ono, June Paik, Al Hansen, and others.55
The success of the FLUXUS movement in attracting attention was the cause of
its failure to achieve its goals.56
As Giorgio Vasari’s famous tome on the lives of his contemporaries
indicates,57 society is interested not only in the works of authors and artists, but
also in exploring the personalities and lives of those who have created socially
prominent works. The reader’s impulse to learn about the author can and does
operate against the interests of the author in some cases. Maciunas is one

very strange work of science fiction. KATHRYN ANN LINDSKOOG, SLEUTHING C. S. LEWIS:
MORE LIGHT IN THE SHADOWLANDS (2001); see also Scott McLemee, Holy War in the
Shadowlands, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July 20, 2001, at A12 (describing Lindskoog’s
allegations of tampering by Lewis’s estate).
51 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, Sept.
9, 1886, revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (protecting the
moral rights of artists by mandating rights of attribution and integrity).
52 ERIKA DOSS, TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN ART 148 (2002) (discussing the work of
George Maciunas).
53 Id.
54 As Maciunas explained in a letter to a friend in 1964, “Eventually we would destroy
the authorship of pieces and make them totally anonymous – thus eliminating artist’s ‘ego.’
Author would be FLUXUS.” THEORIES AND DOCUMENTS OF CONTEMPORARY ART: A
SOURCEBOOK OF ARTISTS’ WRITINGS 725-28 (Peter Selz & Kristine Stiles eds., 1996) (letter
from Maciunas to Thomas Schmit circa 1964).
55 DOSS, supra note 52, at 148 (observing how Maciunas coined “Fluxus”); THOMAS
HOVING, ART FOR DUMMIES 180 (1999) (noting “the Fluxus events of George Maciunas”).
56 See HOVING, supra note 55, at 180 (associating Fluxus with Maciunas despite
Maciunas’s desire for anonymity in his art).
57 VASARI, supra note 7 (remarking on the personal lives of contemporary artists with
whom Vasari was familiar).
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prominent example, and J.D. Salinger presents another.58 Readers have always
been interested in exploring the personality of the artist as a means to
appreciate and further explore the work.59 The practice of exploring and
appreciating literature by exploring the identity of the author was, prior to the
last century, an acceptable academic practice. Only with the ascendancy of
New Criticism was authorial hagiography denigrated.60 New Criticism,
partaking in the broader formalistic rigor of modernism, isolated the text from
the author. The inevitable result of this effort was, perhaps unsurprisingly, the
collapse of the concept of any fixed meaning in texts and the publication of an
essay (authored by Roland Barthes) where the author was proclaimed dead.61
Michel Foucault suggested that authorship acted as an interpretive construct
primarily serving to limit the freedom of potential meanings in a text.62 Yet
throughout all this revolution and interpretive upheaval, the public still was
buying People Magazine and reading about the personal lives of John
Grisham, Steven King, and Tom Clancy. In some respects, new media made

58

Of course, one might question the true motives of Maciunas and Salinger. See, e.g.,
Alex Beam, J.D. Salinger, Failed Recluse, SLATE, June 29, 1999,
http://slate.msn.com/id/31263/ (“If Salinger really wants to be left alone, he is going about it
in a very strange way. He doesn’t live in a gated community. He summons perfect
strangers into his hideaway. He sues people, and then phones the media to spread the
story.”).
59 See Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of
the Work, 68 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 725, 734-35 (1993) (explaining the historical importance
to literary criticism of studying the life and personality of the author).
60 See id. at 734-35 (“New Criticism . . . developed as a reaction to the Romantic notion
of genius and the academic pre-eminence of historical study. In New Critical theory, ‘work’
replaced ‘author’ as the central unifying force in literary criticism. This version of
modernist thought conceived of the creative work as autonomous and ahistorical.”). While
New Criticism is clearly an ideology of interpretation that might be disputed, romantic
authorship (which might be aligned with a more central notion of authorship) has probably
had a more pronounced effect on our system of intellectual property. It is equally
susceptible to critique. See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY x-xi (1996); Boyle, supra note 49
(exploring the importance of determining the author of a work in order to interpret the
meaning of his or her writing); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The
Metamorphoses of “Authorship”, 1991 DUKE L.J. 455 (commenting on how the notion of
authorship has been used in the development of intellectual property law); David Lange, At
Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of Authorship in the PostLiterate Millennium, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 136 (1992) (describing how new
technologies are eroding intellectual property and the constraints on authorship).
61 ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE-MUSIC-TEXT (Stephen Heath,
trans., 1978) (proclaiming that the reader, not the writer, should be at the center of
criticism).
62 See Michel Foucault, What Is an Author?, in THE FOUCAULT READER 101, 107 (Paul
Rabinow ed., 1984) (asserting that the notion of “author” performs a classification and
interpretative function for works, beyond a mere identification role).
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the identity of the artist an even greater public concern. For instance, in the
realm of music, MTV made the combination of image, celebrity, and
marketing triumph over the pure appreciation of sound. From a societal
perspective, the author never died – and she was never even seriously ill.
Well-known post-authorship figures such as Michel Foucault and Jacques
Derrida found their personalities and life histories deeply intertwined with
prevalent social interpretations of their publications.63 When society cares
about a creative work, it cares about the work’s author. Making the connection
between personal identity and creative work has always been a natural move.
Perhaps the clearest evidence that society still cares very much about
authorial attribution is our reactions to plagiarism. While credit-claiming for
the words of others is a fairly common practice,64 it is one that is generally
censured by society. Social norms that condemn plagiarism are, essentially,
The
social norms that strongly condemn authorial misattribution.65
conventional legal understanding of the term “plagiarism” is that it is not a
violation of any law, but a violation of the norm of accurate authorial
attribution.66 Even in this postmodern era, anti-plagiarism norms remain quite
63 See Wikipedia: Michel Foucault, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michel_Foucault (last
visited
Aug.
12,
2005);
Wikipedia:
Jacques
Derrida,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacques_Derrida (last visited Aug. 7, 2005).
64 See Roger Billings, Plagiarism in Academia and Beyond: What Is the Role of the
Courts?, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 391, 396 (2004) (“Almost everyone plagiarizes. Nearly every
time a joke is told it is borrowed without attribution. Abraham Lincoln routinely retold
jokes he borrowed from magazines. Ministers and pastors borrow sermons from each other
without attribution; easily available collections of sermons all but invite plagiarism.”); Lisa
G. Lerman, Misattribution in Legal Scholarship: Plagiarism, Ghostwriting, and Authorship,
42 S. TEX. L. REV. 467, 468 (2001) (“It is as if admission to the bar is like walking through a
looking-glass. On one side, plagiarism is considered to be the most egregious variety of
dishonesty. On the other side, the use of the words and ideas of others without attribution is
not regarded as raising any ethical concern.”).
65 Anonymous, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Web: A Cautionary Tale of
Plagiarism, 93 LAW LIBR. J. 525, 525 (2001) (“Like most of us who manage to get
something we’ve written published, I am always gratified if my work is cited or found
useful enough to be quoted by others. When confronted with this blatant theft of my work,
however, I was shocked and genuinely hurt.”).
66 Randall P. Bezanson, Speaking Through Others’ Voices: Authorship, Originality, and
Free Speech, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 983, 1075 (2003) (“Plagiarism consists of the
conscious taking of another’s specific words and ideas as one’s own without any
attribution.”); Billings, supra note 64, at 392 (“Plagiarism is the borrowing of someone
else’s work without attribution.”); Robert D. Bills, Plagiarism in Law School: Close
Resemblance of the Worst Kind?, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 103, 108 (1990) (“Borrowing
from another’s work with attribution does not constitute an act of plagiary because there is
no pretense of originality.”); Terri LeClercq, Failure to Teach: Due Process and Law
School Plagiarism, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 236, 245 (1999) (“[F]ailure to attribute is key to
plagiarism”); Lisa G. Lerman, Misattribution in Legal Scholarship: Plagiarism,
Ghostwriting, and Authorship, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 467, 475 (2001) (“To claim authorship of
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strong.67 When a public figure is charged with plagiarism, the public concern
is not primarily about protecting the possessory interests of the “owner” of the
stolen words. Instead, society sees itself as the victim of duplicity and is
interested in passing judgment on the character of the plagiarist. Recent
scandals relating to the authorship practices of Stephen Ambrose, Doris Kearns
Goodwin, Laurence Tribe, and Charles Ogletree all demonstrate that the media
is confident that the public wants to hear news about high-profile plagiarism.68
The morality play is clearly the attraction here – in most of these cases, the
average citizen is unlikely to have ever read the materials that were claimed to
have been plagiarized.
II.

LEGAL REGULATION OF AUTHORIAL ATTRIBUTION

Given social interests in attribution, we might expect the law of the United
States to play some regulatory role in the realm of authorial attribution. At the
turn of the last century, the law did play this role.69 Social protections against
work that was in fact authored by another is plagiarism.”); Laurie Steans, Copy Wrong:
Plagiarism, Process, Property, and the Law, 41 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 43, 58 (1998)
(“Plagiarism is not necessarily copyright infringement, nor is copyright infringement
necessarily plagiarism.”).
67 The gulf between literary theory and contemporary social intuitions with regard to
misattributive practices is rather pronounced – New Critical approaches to textual
interpretation don’t seem to square well with modern cultural beliefs about inchoate rights
to appropriate credit. Compare, e.g., PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN A POSTMODERN WORLD (Lise Buranen & Alice M. Roy eds., 1999) (arguing
that prohibitions against plagiarism are problematic in light of contemporary literary
theories), and K.K. RUTHVEN, FAKING LITERATURE i (2001) (arguing that “the production of
a literary forgery is an act that reveals the spurious nature of literature itself”), with Lisa
Lerman, Misattribution in Legal Scholarship: Plagiarism, Ghostwriting, and Authorship, 42
S. TEX. L. REV. 467, 492 (2001) (“This examination of the question of authorship suggests
that there is no justification for a professor to take the work of a research assistant and
publish it as his own.”), and THOMAS MALLON, STOLEN WORDS: THE CLASSIC BOOK ON
PLAGIARISM 243 (Harcourt, Inc. 1st ed. 2001) (“[A]cademics remain curiously willing to
vaporize the whole phenomenon of plagiarism in a cloud of French theory.”).
68 Joseph Bottum, Laurence Tribe and the problem of borrowed scholarship, THE
Oct.
4,
2004,
available
at
WEEKLY
STANDARD,
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/004/674eijco.asp (calling
a book by Tribe on constitutional law “uncomfortably reliant” on another scholar’s work);
Chris Suellentrop, Dead Man Writing: How to Keep Writing Your Late Father’s Books,
SLATE, Feb. 20, 2003, http://slate.msn.com/id/2078980/ (stating that historian Stephen
Ambrose employed members of his family to write portions of his books).
69 See Lauren Wise, King v. Innovation Books: An Analysis of Credit Attribution with
Respect to the Lanham Act, 1 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 147, 147 (1994) (stating that
“[a]uthors may sue under [the Lanham Act] when an erroneous credit is issued”); see also
Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 608 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding Lanham Act cause of action
where the plaintiff actor’s name was omitted and his role attributed to another in film
credits); Williams v. UMG Recordings, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18400, at *17 (C.D. Cal.
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deceptive authorial attributions were not well defined, but they did exist under
the rubric of trademark law.70 However, the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. has essentially
eviscerated the primary basis of those protections.71 In this Part, I will look at
the law that addresses claims involving authorial attribution. First I will turn to
trademark law. Then I will explain how the Supreme Court’s decision in
Dastar affected trademark protections. Following that, I will discuss copyright
as an alternative basis for protection. Finally, I will consider how authorial
attribution might still find some protections under various other regimes.
A.

Misattribution and Trademark Law
1.

Trademark’s Purpose

Trademark law is a part of the broader law of unfair competition.72
Contemporary trademark law originated in English common law, and the early
trademark cases involved the regulation of products created by guilds and
stamped with unique marks of origin.73 These marks of a trade signaled that a
particular collective or individual identity had manufactured a particular
tangible product.74 Trademark law evolved to protect the veracity of these

Aug. 11, 2003) (holding that the Lanham Act claim to authorial attribution in the
documentary credits is precluded by the Supreme Court’s Dastar decision); Follett v. New
American Library, 497 F. Supp. 304, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (granting plaintiffs’ motion
because “the Lanham Act was designed to prevent the presentation of an author’s work to
the public in a distorted form and to protect the public and artist from misrepresentations of
the artist’s contribution to a finished work”).
70 See Smith, 648 F.2d at 608; Williams, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18400, at *17; Follett,
497 F. Supp. at 313.
71 539 U.S. 23, 38 (2003).
72 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003) (declaring that
“[t]raditional trademark infringement law is a part of the broader law of unfair
competition”).
73 See Edward S. Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning Trademarks, 9 MICH. L.
REV. 29, 33 (1910) (“As early as the thirteenth century, the copying of valuable marks
became so common and so injurious that infringement was made a misdemeanor and in
some cases even a felony and was punished in the barbarous manner characteristic of the
times. The Elector Palatine in the Fourteenth Century [sic] issued an edict which, after
reciting that the sale of spurious wine was the most outrageous form of deceit, punished by
hanging any innkeeper who sold ordinary wine as Rudesheimer.”).
74 See FRANK L. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO
TRADE-MARKS (1925) (discussing the historical origin of trademarks for regulation as used
by guilds); Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65
TRADEMARK REP. 265, 280 (1975). But see Steven Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks?, 17
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1999) (suggesting that Schecter’s focus on the
development of trademarks as guild marks ignores the importance of societal interests in
trademark authorship).
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attributions.75 It thus protected primarily against a particular form of consumer
fraud, the marking of trade goods with the mark of a competitor in a manner
that deceived the public as to the source of the product for sale.76 In 1946, the
federal Lanham Act generally codified the common law of trademark.77 The
reach of the Lanham Act’s federal interpretation extends beyond the federal
sphere, however, because many state unfair competition laws are interpreted
congruently with federal Lanham Act decisions.78

FIGURE 1

B

A

Consumers

Figure 1 illustrates the most common situation of trademark infringement,
“passing off.”79 A product is, in some sense, an essential “B” product
(meaning it is produced by entity B, sponsored by entity B, or has qualities
associated with B) and that product is deceptively marked “A” (suggesting it is
produced by entity A, sponsored by entity A, or has qualities associated with
A’s goods). The business that uses (and/or has registered) trademark “A” sues
party B, the sellers of the competing product.80 A alleges that B’s practices are

75

See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003)
(“Federal trademark law . . . helps assure a producer that it and not an imitating competitor
will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product.”); see
also Lee Burgunder, Trademark and Copyright, How Intimate Should the Close Association
Become?, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 89, 94 (1989).
76 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34.
77 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2000) (codifying sections 1 to 46 of the Lanham Act).
78 See, e.g., Williams v. UMG Recordings, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18400, at **26 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 11, 2003) (“The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that state law unfair
competition claims are ‘congruent’ with Lanham Act claims; Plaintiff’s putative unfair
competition claim would fail for the same reasons his Lanham Act claim fails.”).
79 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 28 n.1 (defining passing off); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4 (1995).
80 There is a question of standing here. While the Lanham Act’s broader provisions
literally read that a claim is available to “any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged” by a misrepresentation, these provisions have been limited by some
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likely to confuse consumers into believing that the B products are produced or
sponsored by A. This damages A through lost sales and conceivably lost
goodwill. It also damages consumers because they are not receiving the “A”
sponsored or crafted product they desired. This is classic “passing off” – B is
attempting to pass off its own product as A’s product.81 In order to prevail in a
trademark infringement case, A must demonstrate that consumers are likely to
be confused as to the source or origin of B’s product.82 A’s rights are not
limited to an exact reproduction of A’s mark, but A may also prevail when B
uses look-alike or sound-alike marks that are also likely to confuse
consumers.83
As explained above, trademark protections are justified as creating
incentives for businesses to produce quality goods (by protecting the
usurpation of goodwill) and reducing the product search costs of consumers to
enabling them to trust marks indicating source and origin.84 A key point to
observe is that trademark and unfair competition law are essentially dealing
with the regulation of communicative behaviors.85 Trademark “owners”
possess certain rights to seek legal and equitable relief when their competitors
engage in acts that create public deception.86 The touchstone of trademark and
courts to those parties that can show competitive harms. Halicki v. United Artists
Communications, 812 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Conte Bros. Automotive v.
Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 1998).
81 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4 (1995); see also Dastar, 539 U.S.
at 28 n.1.
82 See 15 U.S.C. §§1117, 1125 (2000).
83 See id. at § 1125 (setting likelihood of consumer confusion as the standard test for
trademark infringement).
84 See, e.g., Elmer William Hanak III, The Quality Assurance Function of Trademarks,
43 FORDHAM L. REV. 363, 364 (1974); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark
Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1987); David G. Post, Pooling
Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and Limited Liability in
Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 160.
85 See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 459 (4th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the notion of trademarks as “property
rights in gross”). Trademark are, however, commonly described as property interests of the
intellectual variety. See, e.g., Michael Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a
Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004) (exploring the equation of intellectual property
with the legal definition of property); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of
the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439 (2003) (exploring the intersection of property
concepts and information); Melissa B. Jacoby & Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Foreclosing
on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted Boundaries of the Right of Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1322, 1344-45 & n.138 (noting that trademarks constitute valuable assets in bankruptcy
proceedings); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031, 1031-32 (suggesting that the equation of property with intellectual property
creates misleading connotations).
86 See Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 722 (2004)
(asserting that “[c]onfusion among consumers is the grave iniquity against which trademark
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unfair competition law is this presence of consumer confusion and deception.
Without a likelihood of consumer confusion, there can be no cause of action
for trademark infringement.87
Trademarks are pervasive today – packaging and advertising familiarize us
with myriads of marks that are understood to indicate origin or sponsorship of
the products on which they are affixed. The animating theory of trademark
law is that these marks are providing us with some information value.88 But
the word “Nike” printed on a pair of sneakers clearly says nothing directly
about the quality of the sneakers (at least to consumers not versed in
mythology). In order for “Nike” to be recognized as a trademark, it must have
some information value, and therefore it must have some meaning to
consumers.89 In other words, it must be recognized not as a word signifying
what the word or symbol might ordinarily signify (a Greek goddess of victory,
for instance), but instead as a mark denoting something about the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of a good. “Apple” printed on a plastic bag
containing apples has a non-trademark meaning. “Apple” printed on a
computer has a secondary, trademark meaning denoting the source or origin of
the computer. Through our commercial and media consumption, we associate
certain marks with particular sources of goods and services and also learn
about certain relevant qualities of particular objects associated with the
marks.90 Even if the public does not know what collective, corporate, sociogeographic, or other identity corresponds to a mark, there is a notion that such

laws and jurisprudence are intended to guard”).
87 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1150 (2000); Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418,
428 (2003) (observing that “[trademark law] broadly prohibits uses of trademarks, trade
names, and trade dress that are likely to cause confusion about the source of a product or
service”). But see Bartow, supra note 86, at 729-38 (criticizing the standard consumer
protection rationale offered in support of trademark law).
88 This theory has been criticized. See Bartow, supra note 86, at 737 (“Reflection on the
ways in which trademarks are actually deployed and employed by commercial interests
makes the assertion that trademarks protect consumers from being confused, mistaken, or
deceived in their purchasing decisions almost laughable, and the contention that broadly
protecting trademarks permits consumers to rely on trademarks as accurate source indicators
is bizarre indeed.”) (citations omitted).
89 This is called “secondary meaning” in trademark law. The term, as others have
observed, is an unfortunate bit of legal jargon. “Secondary” meaning is a good way to
explain how Apple™ and Google™ have second meanings that differ from designations of
a fruit and number, but the Nike swoosh, the word “Häagen-Dazs”, and many other fanciful
trademarks actually have no primary meaning. The word secondary is not important here –
the particular type of meaning the word has, namely a trademark-type meaning, is
important.
90 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to
Trademark Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 613, 614 (1999) (discussing the historic purpose of
trademark law as giving meaning to names and symbols, thereby reducing consumer
confusion).
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a distinct identity does exist.
When trademark law allows the average consumer to discern that there is
some distinction between various things connected via trademarks to three
products marked with the words “Coke,” “Pepsi,” and “Acme Discount Cola,”
trademark law postulates that society is better off.91 (At least, it postulates, the
benefit of regulating permissible speech in this way exceeds any costs imposed
by the regulation.92) It would seem that this is correct.93 Were every producer
entitled to place the label “Pepsi” or “Coke” on any drink produced, it seems
logical that this would lead to a sub-optimal state of information affairs, with
no particular beverage company having a sufficient incentive to invest in a
superior product because all producers would simply adopt the most appealing
mark.94 Consumers would be subject to deceptive information practices in a
world without protected trademarks: inferior producers would freely tag their
products with the marks of superior producers. Indeed, this seems to be
exactly what happens. If one visits a country where trademark laws are not
enforced, one often encounters cheap counterfeits – substandard goods marked
with brands that consumers erroneously believe have the same qualities as
legitimate goods.95
In order to accept that this kind of consumer confusion is harmful, however,
we must accept that trademarks generally signify something that is real and
relevant to purchasing considerations. So what does the word “Nike” mean to
the average consumer when it is affixed to a pair of sneakers? For the typical
consumer, it is worth highlighting how very little information the average
trademark conveys. In the case of Nike, consumers may have heard some
things about the nature, history, geographic location, finances, employment
practices, etc., of the business entity associated with the trademark. In most
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Id. at 636 (describing how trademark law “promotes competitive values”).
Id. at 624 (describing trademark law as a balance of rights between producers and
consumers).
93 But see Bartow, supra note 86. I agree with Professor Bartow that there is copious
information value that trademarks fail to provide and that there is a need for trademark
reform in some areas. However, I believe the traditional view that consumers benefit from
the regulation of trademarks is generally correct. The theoretical integrity of trademark law
relies on the ability of trademarks to benefit consumers – if trademark law were to abandon
consumer benefit as a foundation, there could simply be no plausible theoretical foundation
for trademark regulation.
94 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 270 (2003); see also Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley,
Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 787 n.29
(2004) (explaining that, without trademark law, free-riding would destroy any incentive to
invest in a brand).
95 Sandy Meng-Shan Liu, After WTO Accession: China’s Dilemma with the Trafficking
of Fakes, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1153, 1157 n.19 (2003) (citing statistics on the amount of
counterfeit goods sold in China and describing consumers’ disappointment in the quality of
those goods).
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cases, however, a trademark will denote next to nothing to the average
consumer other than its own existence – it is a signifier without much of a
signified. 96
And when we get down to it: what is Coca-Cola™, or Nike™, or Ford™?
The words lack any clear signification. When used to refer to companies, the
words point to multinational Byzantine structures involving geographically
dispersed mazes of subsidiaries, parents, and affiliate entities with overlapping
boards. For instance, if Hewlett-Packard were to have sold computers marked
with the word “Compaq” in 1998, this would have unquestionably amounted to
trademark infringement under the classic A sues B model. Today, however,
because A is B in that particular situation, the two formerly distinct marks are
policed by an integrated entity.97 The oddness here is not unusual. Some
trademark-holding companies such as Coca-Cola™ don’t really produce
anything, but simply license their mark to other producers.98 Multiple
trademarks are often owned and used by a single enterprise that builds separate
brands in order to possess different shares of the market.
Well-known trademarks are often substantially unhinged from any
associations with any particular things that consumers might know. Some
have taken this absence of clear significance as a reason for questioning why
we protect legal interests in trademarks.99 I generally think that protection is
sound, but clearly there is substantial complexity in claiming that trademarks
provide the public with socially useful information. We should say instead that
the Coca-Cola™ mark on a product, for instance, tells us something primarily
of legal significance. The mark speaks of the complex web of private
orderings and licensing that allowed it to be placed there. Trademarks are, in
practice, almost exclusively signifiers of this type of legal ordering.
I say “almost” for two reasons. First, many trademarks do denote, whether
or not the consumer knows it, particular concrete sources and persons that are
relatively fixed. This reality should be significant for the way we think of
trademark law. Second, even the most amorphous trademarks, those that are
licensed, re-transferred, and detached from clear practical significance, are not
completely unhinged as a legal matter from bearing significance about the
nature of the sold object bearing the mark. For instance, Nike could not simply
transfer its trademark to another company that would immediately sell inferior
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The terms “signified” and “signifier” are used to distinguish the formal sign from the
sign’s social meaning. For an excellent overview of semiotics and thoughts on its
application to trademark law, see Beebe, supra note 22, at 623-24.
97 Michael Kanellos & Ian Fried, HP to buy Compaq for $25 billion, CNET NEWS.COM,
Sept. 3, 2001, http://news.com.com/HP+to+buy+Compaq+for+$25+billion/2100-1001_3272519.html.
98 See Hughes, supra note 18 (noting how Sara Lee also licenses its trademark to other
dessert producers).
99 See, e.g., ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES 1-6
(1998) (examining the cultural reappropriation of trademarks); Bartow, supra note 86.
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shoes and brand them with the Nike™ mark, despite the fact that legal
documents could easily be drawn that would purport to have that effect. An
attempted sale of a trademark interest to a business without similar goodwill
constitutes an abandonment of the mark.100 Professor McCarthy explains:
Use of the mark by the assignee in connection with a different good will
and different product would result in a fraud on the purchasing public,
who reasonably assume that the mark signifies the same things, whether
used by one person or another. The law’s requirement that good will
always go with the trademark is a way of insuring that the assignee’s use
of the mark will not be deceptive, and will not break the continuity of the
thing symbolized by the assigned mark.101
So, according to the case law on abandonment, as summarized by Professor
McCarthy, trademark law is not a willy-nilly legal structuring of licenses for
signifier uses. Other doctrine and statutory provisions in trademark law
support this notion. Trademarks, in theory, should point to some substantive
“thing symbolized by the assigned mark.”
Another indicator of the existence of a meaningful signified is the viability
of claims of “reverse passing off.” Reverse passing off is essentially the same
situation described in Figure 1 above. A product made by “B” is deceptively
marked “A” and sold to the public. The only difference in “reverse passing
off,” as opposed to “passing off,” is that it is B, not A, that brings the action for
trademark infringement.102 One might ask where the social harm accrues in
instances of reverse passing off. After all, there is no requirement for the cause
of action that A acquired the product of B through improper means. Given that
A has possession of the good, if the marks A™ and B™ were devoid of legal
meaning, where would be the harm if A marked goods that it rightfully owns
with its own separate mark of “source”? Isn’t A then the source of the
product? For all we know, B might decide to license A to sell B’s goods under
the A™ mark even though A did not produce the good – thus turning a
potential reverse passing off claim into a non-objectionable licensing
arrangement.103 Indeed, if A’s mark is Coca-Cola™ or Sara Lee™, this is
essentially what happens, with B essentially paying A for the privilege of using
A™ and A contractually subjecting B to certain standards of product quality.104
But where such a licensing arrangement does not exist, and where A has
removed or obscured B’s mark and replaced it with A™, the law for some
100 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
18:2, at 18-6 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2005).
101 Id. (emphasis added); Fair Undercar Care, Inc. v. Wakefield, , at *16 (N.D. Ill. July 2,
1992) (quoting MCCARTHY).
102 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5 (1995).
103 Cross, supra note 20, at 730 (explaining that a producer cannot sue for reverse
passing off if the producer consented to the rebranding).
104 See The Coca-Cola Company, http://www.coca-cola.com (last viewed August 9,
2005) (stating that the company’s syrup is sold by local distribution companies worldwide).
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reason finds a cause of action.105 Why? One can explain the claim of reverse
passing off by understanding how it presumes the notion that a trademark
signifies some thing. The notion must be that B is the true producer of the
good and that the accurate designation of B’s mark has greater positive value
to society than the use of A’s mark.106 B’s actual production of the object, in
the absence of a licensing arrangement with A, gives B the right to designate
its production with its own mark – B’s claim of attribution is more true
because B is the actual producer of the product. Thus, A’s act of replacing
B™ with A™ is deceptive to society (at least more deceptive than B’s
intended marking) because A did not actually produce the product.107 Again,
this provides evidence of the promotion of truth as a goal of trademark law.
2.

Authorship as Trademark

If one were, simply as a thought experiment, to equate authorial attributions
with trademarks and works of authorship with all other goods, misattribution
would capture a situation that seems generally analogous to trademark
infringement.108 Looking again at Figure 1, if John Doe (“B”) were to claim
his novel was the work of John Grisham (“A”), John Doe would be liable, in
this thought experiment, for traditional “passing off.” Consumers would be
deceived as to the authorship of the work, mistakenly assuming that Grisham
wrote the novel written by Doe.
Plagiarism, on the other hand, would be analogous to reverse passing off. 109
If John Grisham (“A”) were to sell a novel written by John Doe (“B”) and were
to attribute authorship to himself, he would be liable (again – only in the
context of this thought experiment) for “reverse passing off.”110 From the
consumer perspective, as in the standard passing off situations, the result of
Grisham’s deception would be identical to the result of Doe’s deception.
Consumers would mistakenly assume that Grisham wrote the novel written by
Doe. Because Doe would be the true author, society would be deceived. The
only relevant difference in the two fact patterns would be in the identity of the
party responsible for the consumer deception.
Importing theories of trademark to the realm of authorship appears facile at
first. Just as trademarks familiarize us with words and logos, the packaging
and advertising of movies, music, and even learned legal treatises familiarize
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RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5 (1995).
See Kwall, supra note 5, at 1005 (noting that one court found reverse passing off
objectionable because it deceives consumers).
107 See id.
108 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5 (1995) (defining trademark
infringement).
109 See Green, supra note 25, at 203 (“The analogy between reverse palming off and
plagiarism should be clear.”).
110 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5 (1995) (defining reverse
passing off as marking another’s goods with one’s own trademark).
106

1194

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:1171

us with certain words that are the personal names of the authors and artists who
created these works. These authorial tags, like trademarks, generally have
little initial information value to consumers. Just as there is little or no a priori
meaning or value in the connection of the four or five letters comprising “Dell”
or “Pepsi” with computers and beverages, there is little value in the association
of the strings of letters in “Steven Spielberg,” “Marni Nixon,” or “John Henry
Wigmore” with works of film, music, or legal scholarship. Yet by tasting
things marked as Pepsi™ and encountering the word Pepsi™ in social
communications and the media, we assemble a mental construct of what
Pepsi™ means. The same is true for authors. Regardless of our like or dislike
of products marked with “Tom Clancy,” most of us have some impression of
what the word “Tom Clancy” denotes about the nature of a thing when the
word is affixed to a novel. When we select among an array of possible choices
in books, movies, and music, we base our decisions as to whether or not to
purchase a Tom Clancy novel (at least in part) upon the qualities we have
learned to associate with Tom Clancy.111 Of course, those selling products are
well aware of how we think about our purchases, and they know how
particular authorial attributions, like particular trademark designations, can be
used to sell music, books, and movies.112
The value of trademarks for cars, computers, and sneakers can wax and
wane as brand reputations for quality and prestige fluctuate. Similarly, various
author tags wax and wane in value over time, as a result of changing authorial
outputs and shifting tastes. In 2004, Dan Brown was a “hot” author, just as the
Apple iPod was a “hot” consumer gadget. When deciding whether or not to
purchase the latest Steven King, Tom Clancy, or J.K. Rowling novel, the first
question for most purchasers may be whether they (or a trusted friend) deemed
recent novels by that author to be quality products.113 The same is true for
goods marked with trademarks.
3.

Authorship vs. Trademark

My argument thus far may suggest that we can and should equate author
names with traditional trademarks. Yet we can’t and we shouldn’t. Author
names are not the same thing as “Nike” and “Coca-Cola”. It is true that

111
See Pinover, supra note 40, at 38 (“Publishers, record companies, movie companies
and the entertainment industry count on known names to sell their products, just as
trademarks sell soap and cereal.”); see also Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003) (commenting that purchasers of novels are probably
interested “primarily[] in the identity of the creator of the story”).
112 See Randolph Stuart Sergent, Building Reputational Capital: The Right of Attribution
Under Section 43 of the Lanham Act, 19 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 45 (1995).
113 Karen L. Gulick, Creative Control, Attribution and the Need for Disclosure: A Study
of Incentives in the Motion Picture Industry, 27 CONN. L. REV. 53, 97 (1994) (“[W]hen
purchasing one-time experience goods, consumers frequently rely on the advice of family,
friends, and occasionally, consumer magazines.”).
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personal names do transform into legally protected trademarks frequently.
Some of the oldest and most famous trademarks originated with personal
names, such as Disney™, Ford™, McDonald’s™, DuPont™, Tiffany™,
Calvin Klein™, Johnson & Johnson™, Macy’s™, etc. Yet when we buy
products marked with Ford™ and Disney™, we are not buying the authors
Walt Disney and Henry Ford. We may no longer even make the mental
association between the trademarks and the personal names that were their
source. Whereas personal names are used to identify persons, trademarks are
commercial marks used to identify the origins of goods or services.
If we were to equate names with trademarks, one problem would be that
most personal names are not unique. Common first names (like James,
Michael, or John) tend to be preferred for children.114 Surnames are rarely
original. Many parents conjoin a traditional name with a common surname
and children are given names that are already in current use. If we were
talking of trademarks, this kind of widespread use of identical marks would be
verboten. In the context of personal names, identical names may cause
confusion, yet it seems entirely appropriate that parents should have the
freedom to name their children as they please without having to deal with the
Patent and Trademark Office. If your surname is Ford and you have named
your son Henry (a traditional name), it seems appropriate that this “new”
Henry Ford should be free to denote his authorship of his school writing
assignments without a license from a certain car company.
However, if young Henry Ford wants to use his personal name to sell
automotive goods and services, trademark law will likely interfere. If prior
entrants have already established public reputations associated with marks that
are personal names, subsequent entrants attempting to use the same names may
be barred from utilizing their personal names in association with the sale of
goods in related markets.115 The law does recognize that there is something
vaguely unfair about this to the “new” Henry Ford that just wants to use his
name to sell his automotive parts.116 Judicial opinions sometimes express the
view that people should have an assumed right to use their own names in
relation with business ventures if these efforts are made in good faith and
without improper motives – even if some degree of consumer confusion results

114
1990 Census Bureau data indicates that over ten percent of males are named either
James, John, Robert, or Michael. See FREQUENTLY OCCURRING FIRST NAMES AND
SURNAMES
FROM
THE
1990
CENSUS,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/genealogy/names (last modified Mar. 31, 2005). Female name
choices typically demonstrate a bit more flexibility. See id.
115 See Quentin R. Wittrock, Note, Use of Personal Names in Noncompeting Businesses
– Doctrines of Unfair Competition, Trademark Infringement, and Dilution, 70 IOWA L. REV.
995, 997 (1985) (concluding that current law may prevent a local business from using the
same trademark as a business that operates nationally, even if the local trademark is the
business owner’s name).
116 See id.
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from the use.117 Courts will therefore bend the strict rules of trademark to give
some breathing room to business owners with personal names that might
otherwise infringe trademarks. However, you have no absolute right to use
your personal name in relation with your business.118
Perhaps this impediment to personal name use is ameliorated by the fact that
birth names are often fairly dull trademarks and one does not have to choose a
trademark for a business or product that is identical to one’s personal name.
And perhaps it is also ameliorated by the fact that that the marks we associate
with our persons are flexible, from both a legal and social perspective.
Authors and celebrities have regularly refashioned their identifying signs in
order to facilitate self-marketing. Marion Morrison changed his name to John
Wayne and Prince Rogers Nelson (who was formerly known as “Prince”)
changed his name to a symbol defying conventional articulation – reportedly in
order to escape certain contractual restrictions.119 Skimming a random sample
of such substitutions reveals the unsurprising fact that when authors and
celebrities adopt new symbols to identify themselves, they pick better
trademarks: shorter, more memorable names with more appealing
connotations.120 It is probably also worth noting that this has often entailed the

117

Id.
Id.
119 Though the symbol defies articulation, it has the benefit of being registered as a
trademark and also subject to copyright protection, unlike the vast majority of personal
names. Judge Posner explained:
The defendant, identified only as ‘Prince’ in the caption of the various pleadings, is a
well-known popular singer whose name at birth was Prince Rogers Nelson, but who for
many years performed under the name Prince and since 1992 has referred to himself by
an unpronounceable symbol reproduced as Figure 1 at the end of this opinion. The
symbol is his trademark but it is also a copyrighted work of visual art that licensees of
Prince have embodied in various forms, including jewelry, clothing, and musical
instruments.
Pickett v. Prince, 207 F.3d 402, 403 (7th Cir. 2000) (parenthetical comments omitted).
120 Fabricated monikers include Woody Allen (Allen Konigsberg), Alan Alda (Alphonso
D’Abruzzo), Anne Bancroft (Anna Maria Italiano), Pat Benatar (Patricia Andrejewski), Jack
Benny (Benjamin Kubelsky), Mel Brooks (Melvin Kaminsky), George Burns (Nathan
Birnbaum), Tom Cruise (Thomas Mapother IV), Tony Curtis (Bernard Schwartz), Kirk
Douglas (Issur Danielovitch), Bob Dylan (Robert Zimmerman), Cary Grant (Archibald
Leach), Elton John (Reg Dwight), Karl Malden (Mladen Sekulovich), Barry Manilow
(Barry Alan Pincus), Ricky Martin (Enrique Martin Morales), Walter Matthau (Walter
Matuschanskayasky), Chuck Norris (Carlos Ray), George Orwell (Eric Blair), Jack Palance
(Walter Palanuik), Martin Sheen (Ramon Estevez), Ringo Starr (Richard Starkey), Sting
(Gordon Sumner), and Mark Twain (Samuel Clemens). For more examples, see Nom de
Guerre, http://go.to/realnames (last visited Sept. 16, 2005). Such monikers are not always
voluntarily adopted. Some performers have been pressured to use stage names. This was
allegedly the case with John Mellencamp (né John Mellencamp, but previously called
Johnny Cougar, John Cougar, and John Cougar Mellencamp). See Wikipedia: John Cougar
Mellencamp, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Cougar_Mellencamp (last visited Aug. 7,
118
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abandonment of names that signify association with an ethnic minority.121
The freedom to refashion a personal name is not unlimited or without some
downside. While businesses may routinely invent new marks for themselves
and their new products and services, prior personal names are more difficult to
abandon. Abandoning a name entails a significant social network cost, as all
spouses who have adopted new surnames after marriage know.122 And
modification is not always effective where the public has grown accustomed to
a prior signifier: Prince Nelson is still called Prince.123 Yet the flexibility to
rename oneself is still employed for various purposes. Female authors often
employ pseudonyms in order to mask their gender,124 and it is not uncommon
for authors to employ pen names for particular purposes, such as to write
anonymously or in a form or genre with which they are not traditionally
associated.125
The use of a personal name in relation to the sale of creative works of
authorship, therefore, raises some interesting questions for trademark law. It
would seem wise to avoid any simple equation of an author’s name with a
trademark interest – especially if we want to allow later authors who share the
personal names of prior authors to use their given names.126 Additionally, the
requirement of secondary meaning is somewhat problematic. Personal names
invariably speak to consumers of a personal identity. Whereas trademarks are
inherently commercial and are theoretically associated with the qualities of

2005). Not all celebrities take or are forced to take this course – for instance, Madonna and
Britney Spears are well known for the hyper-fabrication of their popular images, but have
retained their birth names: Madonna Louise Ciccone and Britney Jean Spears, respectively.
121 See Nom de Guerre, supra note 120.
122 And of course this can, in some cases, be a choice of both spouses. See Eric Schlacter
Changes Name to Eric Goldman, Eric Goldman Homepage, Dec. 24, 1997,
http://eric_goldman.tripod.com/personal/namechange.htm.
123 See supra note 119. Any unilateral demand that a functioning signifier should be
replaced with a new one pointing to an identical signified runs the risk of being ignored or
creating some social problems. An interesting example was when, in 1966, the Chinese
government tried to replace the standard traffic light “Red=Stop, Green=Go” signification
with a new pro-Communist “Red=Go, Green=Stop” signification. After numerous
accidents, the attempt was abandoned. See NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF, CHINA WAKES: THE
STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF A RISING POWER 70 (1994).
124 Male author names, like non-minority celebrity names, are generally deemed to be
more marketable, especially in genres where male adolescents may be purchasers. See Saul
Levmore, The Anonymity Tool, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2191, 2210-11 (1996) (discussing “crosspenning”). While some female authors employ male pseudonyms, others simply mask their
gender identity by using initials rather than their first names. See id.
125 See id. at 2207-15 (discussing pseudonymity). Professor Laura Heymann makes the
observation that these “authornyms” share many of the qualities of trademarks. Heymann,
supra note 17, at 1378.
126 See Wittrock, supra note 115 (discussing when personal names may be used as
trademarks despite their lack of uniqueness).
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goods,127 personal identities are neither of these things. Yet it is clear that
names of authors can and do acquire the same type of commercial significance
and secondary meaning that we associate with marks. Famous authors
demonstrate that the personal name of an author or artist can accumulate the
goodwill and selling power that is associated with a trademark. Pseudonyms
and stage names demonstrate that personal names as signifiers can be made
flexible and optimized for selling power, just as trademarks are.128 In terms of
the power of names to denote a real and meaningful signified that has
information value to the public, personal names are arguably superior to
trademarks because they point to actual persons. Thus, one might argue that
they are more deserving of legal, trademark-type protections. Confronted by
the strong reasons for recognizing some trademark-like interest in a personal
name, courts historically allowed creative authors to pursue trademark-like
actions where their names function much like unregistered trademarks.129
Where the marketing of a work created consumer confusion as to the
authorial “source” of a work, trademark law provided a legal mechanism for
authors to bring claims based upon the misattribution of their creative efforts.
There are many examples, but a well-known case in this vein is Follett v. New
American Library.130 A publishing company, William Collins Sons &
Company Ltd., had employed (then relatively unknown) author and journalist
Ken Follett to make editorial revisions to a book named The Heist of the
127

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4 (1995).
See supra note 120.
129 Because personal names were rarely registered as trademarks, courts generally
applied Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000)), which
states, in relevant part:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services . . . uses in commerce
any word, term, name, symbol, or device . . . or any false designation of origin . . .
which . . . is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . . as to the
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods . . . shall be liable in a civil action
by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
See also Pinover, supra note 40, at 40 (“Although artistic identity may not be thought of as a
traditional trademark, it should not be surprising that Section 43(a) provides artists and
authors protection for the proper attribution of their products. The trademarks or
identifications of source are their names.”); id. at 43-44 (discussing Follett v. Arbor House
Publishing, 1980 US Dist. LEXIS 13287 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1980)); id. at 44-45
(discussing Geisel v. Poytner Products, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)); id. at 4546 (discussing Lamonthe v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1043 (9th Cir. 1988)); id. at
46-48 & n.30-35 (discussing other cases involving claims of artistic misattribution under the
Lanham Act); Gulick, supra note 113, at 112-13 (recounting cases where the Lanham Act
was used successfully to prevent instances of misattribution); Natalie C. Suhl, Note, Moral
Rights Protection in the United States Under the Berne Convention: A Fictional Work?, 12
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1203, 1218 (2002) (“Courts often interpret the
prohibition against ‘reverse passing off’ in 43(a) as providing authors with a legitimate right
to seek proper credit for their work.”).
130 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
128
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Century.131 The book described a factual event: a bank robbery and
subsequent trial. Three anonymous French journalists had collaborated in
writing the book. It was to be published under the joint pseudonym “Rene
Louis Maurice.”132 Follett made extensive revisions to the original work.133
As a result of his editorial modifications, he requested a byline on the title and
some copyright interest in the revised works. The copyright request was
denied, but it was agreed that the novel would attributed to “Rene Louis
Maurice with Ken Follett.” The book was published in England in 1978 with
“Rene Louis Maurice” alone listed on the cover, and “with Ken Follett”
included on the title page. The book failed to find a publisher in America.134
Subsequently, Ken Follett published Eye of the Needle, which became a best
seller in the United States.135 As Follett’s fame grew, an American publishing
company, Arbor House, contracted with the owners of the copyright in The
Heist of the Century to republish the book under the title The Gentlemen of 16
July. The jacket cover that was planned read: “by the author of TRIPLE and
EYE OF THE NEEDLE: KEN FOLLETT with Rene Louis Maurice.”136 It
was planned that Follett’s name would be the only name on the spine of the
book and would appear in letters roughly twice the size of the French authors’
pseudonym on the cover. Follett learned of the plan and brought suit.
After dispensing with claims based on copyright and the New York state
publicity laws, the court arrived at what it perceived to be the heart of the case.
“The key issue, then, is whether the designation of authorship which Arbor
House proposes to utilize on the cover of The Gentlemen of 16 July constitutes
a violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act . . . .”137 The court concluded
that
although Follett’s revisions may have been more substantial than those
which an editor would ordinarily perform . . . it is misleading to depict
him as the principal author of The Gentlemen of 16 July. His
contributions display none of the special creative attributes which are
associated with authorship. Thus, the representation that Follett is the
principal author of the book is literally false. . . . The Lanham Act . . . is
designed . . . to protect the public and the artist from misrepresentations

131

Id. at 306.
Id. at 305
133 Id. at 306.
134 Id.
135 KEN FOLLETT, EYE OF THE NEEDLE (1978). Eye of the Needle was actually a republication of his novel Storm Island, which had already been printed in England in 1977.
Ken Follett Library: Eye of the Needle, http://www.ken-follett.com/bibliography/eye.html
(last visited Sept. 16, 2005).
136 Follett, 497 F. Supp. at 308.
137 Id. at 312-13.
132
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of the artist’s contribution to a finished work.138
Follett succeeded in invoking the Lanham Act to enjoin the publication of
the book with the proposed misleading designation of authorship.139 It should
be noted that none of the cases like Follett that applied the Lanham Act to
claims of authorial misattribution were capable of articulating a coherent
theory of exactly what authorship was and how it intersected with the
protections granted by trademark law. Indeed, the court in the Follett case
declared at one point in the opinion that matters of authorship were difficult to
theorize:
The concept of authorship is elusive and inexact. Although I do not
presuppose to offer a definitive analysis of qualities which give rise to
authorship, some such definition is essential to a resolution of the issue
before the court. The parties have cited no cases in which the concept of
authorship has been carefully dissected, and this court has discovered
none.140
Yet despite this admission, the court did not shy away from the issue, but
instead sallied forth into the difficult task of ascertaining the truth of claims
about authorship. Follett and similar cases were united by a common belief
that designations of authorship, like trademarks, could be determined to be true
or false designations, could mislead consumers as to salient qualities of goods,
and that protection under trademark law was thus required.141 However, all
those cases are no longer reliable precedent after the Supreme Court’s recent
holding in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,142 which I will
turn to next.
B.

The Dastar Decision

The Supreme Court’s most prominent intellectual property decision in the
2003 term was undoubtedly Eldred v. Ashcroft,143 decided in January. In
Eldred, a seven Justice majority of the Court upheld a Congressional extension
of copyright terms by twenty years in the face of a constitutional challenge.144
Turning to trademark law in March, the Supreme Court issued Moseley v. V
Secret Catalogue, Inc.,145 which, as a practical matter, severely limited the

138

Id.
Id. at 313.
140 Id. at 312.
141 King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824, 831 (2d Cir. 1992) (locating the harm of
misattribution in consumer deception); Geisel v. Poytner Prods, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 34853 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (discussing whether any injury to the plaintiff or public deception
occurred in the copyright context).
142 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
143 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
144 Id.
145 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
139
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power of the poorly worded and controversial 1995 Federal Trademark
Dilution Act.146 In June, the Supreme Court trimmed back trademark law yet
when it decided Dastar.
The factual background of the Dastar case is complex. In 1948, shortly
after the end of World War II (and shortly before Eisenhower’s successful
presidential campaign in 1952), Doubleday & Company published Dwight D.
Eisenhower’s “personal account of World War II,” entitled Crusade in
Europe.147 The attribution of authorship to Eisenhower was clearly an
intended selling point for the book, just as the attribution to Follett was
intended as a selling point of The Gentlemen of 16 July. The front of the dust
jacket was taken up with a portrait of a serene and smiling Eisenhower in
military uniform against a blank background. The back inside dust cover bore
a ringing endorsement from Allan Nevins, described as an “eminent historian.”
Nevins informed the reader that one of the chief merits of the book was the
identity of the author:
Above all, [the book] expresses the personality of the author. Readers
will feel this is General Eisenhower speaking. That fact, indeed, is one of
the chief merits of the work. It has an air of genuineness, a ring of
sincerity; the tone is that of a leader, a serene, highly sagacious leader
pouring out his special knowledge with the heartiest desire to tell the truth
about himself and others.148
Crusade in Europe sold very well – it was even a Book-of-the-Month
Club® selection – and this created a demand for a video adaptation.
Doubleday licensed exclusive television rights to an affiliate of Twentieth
Century Fox so that a television series could be produced.149 Fox contracted
with Time, Inc. for the production, and the television series produced in 1949
was also called Crusade in Europe.150 Time then assigned its copyright in the
television series back to Twentieth Century Fox. Doubleday renewed its
copyright in the book in 1975. Fox, however, failed to renew the copyright in
the video footage in a timely manner.151 Thus, while the copyright in the book
continued, the copyright in the video expired in 1977.152 Crusade in Europe
146

See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000). The Supreme Court’s requirement of a showing of
“actual injury” to bring a cause of action for trademark dilution effectively checked the
expansion of the dilution remedy into a broader property right. See Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003). Trademark dilution has always been a controversial
doctrine and, as Professor McCarthy has noted, is often misinterpreted by district courts. 3
MCCARTHY § 24, supra note 100, at 24-108 to 24-112.
147 Id. at 25-26.
148 DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, CRUSADE IN EUROPE (1948) (dust jacket) (on file with
author).
149 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 25-26.
150 Id. at 26.
151 Id. at 23.
152 Id.

1202

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:1171

(the video) entered the public domain, that realm of information matter in
which no copyright subsists.153
At the end of the twentieth century, there was a renewed interested in World
War II accompanying the fiftieth anniversary of many of the war’s events. The
blockbuster film Saving Private Ryan was released along with a slew of other
entertainment products. Dastar, a small Oregon corporation, saw an interesting
opportunity in the public domain video footage of Crusade in Europe. It took
the original footage (obtained from original copies), re-edited that footage
slightly, and released it in 1995 as a seven-video set sold under the name
World War II Campaigns in Europe.154 Dastar must have recognized that the
sale of a video that relied heavily on references and passages from a book,
Crusade in Europe, would create potential copyright issues. So Dastar
removed all video passages making references to the book. Dastar probably
also feared that references to the original attributions of authorship to
Twentieth Century Fox and Time might create trademark issues – so Dastar
deleted the original film credits that appeared within the original video.155 The
Dastar version of the footage contained a new credit sequence, which was
limited to the names of the Dastar editors. Each of the seven Dastar videos
began with the words “Dastar Presents . . . .”156
Fox, also anticipating the anniversary of the World War, re-acquired the
book’s video adaptation rights and arranged for the re-release of Crusade in
Europe.157 Fox did not appreciate the competition from Dastar, which was
essentially selling the same Crusade in Europe footage at half the price. Fox
brought suit, alleging that by removing the original authorial credits to
Twentieth Century Fox, Dastar had engaged in authorial misattribution,
implicitly claiming that it had authored the video.158 Fox alleged this violated
federal trademark law by creating consumer confusion as to the source and
origin of the video footage. Doubleday, co-plaintiff, alleged that the copies of
the video footage were derivative works that infringed Doubleday’s copyright
in the original book.159
Both Fox and Doubleday prevailed in the district court. Fox’s victory was
directly attributable to the Ninth Circuit’s “bodily appropriation” standard.160

153 See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 967 (1990)
(characterizing the public domain as the stock of raw material from which most creative
work is derived).
154 WORLD WAR II: CAMPAIGNS IN EUROPE (Dastar 1995).
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 26.
158 Id. at 27.
159 Id.
160 See Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 1994) (adopting the bodily
appropriation test); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1364 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining the
scope of the Lanham Act).
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The standard was addressed particularly to the situation where trademark law
was applied to claims involving the authorship of materials protected by
copyright. A similar (slightly more expansive) standard was being used in the
Second Circuit.161 Essentially, both the Ninth Circuit’s “bodily appropriation”
and the Second Circuit’s “substantial similarity” tests merged elements of
copyright and trademark law by allowing a presumption of consumer
confusion under trademark law where a substantial portion of a creative work
of authorship was misattributed. Thus, an evidentiary showing of copyrightlike similarity between creative works served to trigger a presumption of
trademark infringement. The district court in Dastar found, pursuant to the
applicable doctrine, Dastar’s actions amounted to a willful violation of the
federal Lanham Act.162 It awarded Fox not only Dastar’s profits of
$1,567,213.66, but also attorney’s fees totaling $1,481,898.163 Doubleday was
awarded statutory damages of $150,000 for copyright infringement.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded
Doubleday’s copyright claim with regard to the book due to a factual question,
but affirmed the ruling in Fox’s favor with regard to the Lanham Act claim. 164
The Ninth Circuit decision was unpublished. The Supreme Court’s grant of
certiorari to Dastar’s petition for review was therefore something of a surprise.
Amicus parties generally assumed that the Supreme Court took the case in
order to strike down the standards in use by the Ninth and Second Circuits.
Because the standards were a judicial doctrine that amalgamated the subject
matter of copyright and the mechanism of trademark, they did seem prone to
legal challenge – clear support for the unique standard could be found in
neither body of law.165 Thus, a frequent argument in the amicus briefs was that
the bodily appropriation standard (and the Dastar decision by extension) was

161

Waldman Publ’g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 783 (2d Cir. 1994); see also
Kwall, supra note 5, at 1005 (describing the “bodily appropriation” test and the Second
Circuit’s substantially similar “substantial similarity” test).
162 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 27-28.
163 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Dastar Corp., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22064, at
*34 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2000), vacated sub nom. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v.
Entm’t Distrib., 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 7426, at **315-16 (9th Cir. Apr. 19, 2002).
164 The Ninth Circuit found there were triable issues of fact with regard to Doubleday’s
claims to copyright ownership. Doubleday argued that, under the copyright statute, it was
the original “author” of the book because Eisenhower had produced the book as a “work for
hire.” Twentieth Century Fox, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 7426, at *314; but see id. (“The sale
agreement between Eisenhower and Doubleday also gives no indication that the book was a
work for hire.”). The work for hire doctrine is discussed briefly in Part III.C. infra.
165 Amicus briefs were filed by several interested parties, many of which made these
arguments. See, e.g., Brief of Malla Pollack and Other Law Professors on Question One
Supporting Dastar Corp., Dastar, 539 U.S. 23 (No. 02-428); Brief of the American
Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Neither Party, Dastar, 539 U.S. 23 (No.
02-428); Brief of the American Library Association et al., Dastar, 539 U.S. 23 (No. 02428); Brief of the International Trademark Association, Dastar, 539 U.S. 23 (No. 02-428).
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erroneous as a matter of trademark doctrine because it failed to require
evidence of consumer confusion.166
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Dastar, as expected.167 However, the
Supreme Court’s opinion did more than merely negate the aberrant hybrid
doctrines. Instead, the Court made a sweeping statement about the scope and
nature of trademark law. In language that has been cited by numerous district
court opinions in the past two years, the Court stated that the scope of
trademark law was limited to the misattribution of “the producer of the
tangible product sold in the marketplace.”168 The implications of this
pronouncement are startling. According to the Court, if Dastar had taken the
Fox videotapes, removed an attribution to Fox and resold the tapes with a
Dastar label, this type of misattribution would have been actionable pursuant to
the Lanham Act as “reverse passing off.”169 However, because Dastar actually
produced the physical videotape and only copied the intangible expression, the
Court found that Dastar had not violated the Lanham Act by attributing the
origin of the videotape to itself.170 Query what difference this would actually
make to consumers. Yet, bizarre as it may seem, that is what the opinion of the
Court says.171
Though subsequent district courts have uniformly relied on this “tangible
product” language, other interpretations of the case have been proffered in

166

See supra note 165; see also 3 MCCARTHY § 24.03[2], supra note 100, at 24-13.
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 38.
168 Id. at 31. District court opinions citing this language include Gen. Universal Sys.,
Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 149 (5th Cir. 2004); Smith v. New Line Cinema, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18382, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2004); Schiffer Publ’g, Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, 350
F. Supp. 2d 613, 617 (E.D. Pa. 2004); Larkin Group, Inc. v. Aquatic Design Consultants,
Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1129 (D. Kan. 2004); Bob Creeden & Assocs. v. Infosoft, Inc.,
326 F. Supp. 2d 876, 879 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Tao of Sys. Integration, Inc. v. Analytical Servs.
& Materials, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 565, 572 (E.D. Va. 2004); Carroll v. Kahn, 68
U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1357, at *16 (N.D.N.Y. 2003); Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith Sys. Mfg.
Co., 286 F. Supp. 2d 969, 971-72 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Boston Int’l Music, Inc. v. Austin, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16240, at *4-5 (D. Mass. Sept. 12, 2003); and Williams v. UMG
Recordings, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
169 The Court stated that a claim for reverse passing off “would undoubtedly be sustained
if Dastar had bought some of New Line’s Crusade videotapes and merely repackaged them
as its own.” Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31. Oddly, this result was exactly the converse of what
Professor John Cross (who joined an amicus brief on behalf of Dastar) had cogently argued
was the proper policy direction to take for claims of reverse passing off. See Cross, supra
note 20, at 766 (“In conclusion, then, the special characteristics of the artist justify granting
a limited cause of action for reverse passing off to artists, but not to others.”); id. at 772
(“The only case in which reverse passing off can be justified is when a work of art,
literature, or music is involved.”).
170 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31-32 (understanding “origin of goods” to refer to the producer of
the physical videotape).
171 The opinion spoke for eight Justices. Justice Breyer was recused. Id.
167
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academic commentary. By far the most common interpretation of Dastar in
law review articles and student Notes has been that the case constituted a
victory for the public domain.172 In other words, because the Supreme Court in
Dastar failed to apply trademark law to prohibit the sale materials that had
been previously protected by copyright but which had fallen into the public
domain, the decision ensured that public domain materials would be maximally
free for public use without being encumbered by restrictive intellectual
property protections.173 Professor Jane Ginsburg has suggested that some
members of the Court may have seen Dastar as an act of contrition for Eldred
v. Ashcroft, a decision that many criticized for failing to vigorously protect the
public domain.174
Two amicus briefs submitted by groups of law professors in Dastar had

172

See, e.g., Jessica Bohrer, Strengthening the Distinction Between Copyright and
Trademark: The Supreme Court Takes a Stand, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 23, 27-28
(“The Court . . . was rightfully concerned that allowing the line to blur in a case such as this
would create a state of ‘perpetual copyright protection’ that could nullify the intent and
effect of copyright and trademark law.”); Hughes, supra note 18, at 32 (“Where Eldred
accepted Congress’s 20 year extension of copyright – thereby sharply curtailing what will
go into the public domain for decades – Dastar shows the Court to be highly protective of
the public domain.”); Lynn McLain, Thoughts On Dastar From a Copyright Perspective: A
Welcome Step Toward Respite for the Public Domain, 11 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. J. 71, 91
(2003) (“It is to be hoped that the Court will continue the work that it has begun. The public
domain’s borders . . . must not be permitted to be truncated by other bodies of law . . . .”);
Kurt M. Saunders, A Crusade in the Public Domain: The Dastar Decision, 30 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 161, 178 (2004) (calling the decision “wise” and stating that “[i]n
the end, what Dastar teaches, if nothing else, is that unless a valid intellectual property
right, such as a patent or copyright, protects something, it may be freely copied and
distributed without attribution”); Richard Ronald, Note, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp., 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 243 (2004) (“[T]he Dastar Court frees
manufactures [sic] to use public domain works without fear of a burdensome attribution
requirement.”); Joshua K. Simko, Comment, “Every Artist Is a Cannibal, Every Poet Is a
Thief”: Why the Supreme Court Was Right To Reverse the Ninth Circuit In Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 355, 356 (2004) (arguing that the
Supreme Court correctly decided Dastar); Eugene Quinn, Dastar v. Fox: Public Domain
Wins in the U.S. Supreme Court, JURIST (June 4, 2003), (calling the decision “a victory
for . . . the public domain”).
173 With regard to the public domain, see generally James Boyle, The Second Enclosure
Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33
(2003) (relating the English enclosure movement to intellectual property rights). See also
Litman, supra note 153, at 996.
174 Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 267 (“In what some might see as an act of contrition for
having upheld copyright term extension in Eldred v. Ashcroft, [Dastar made clear] that a
work’s entry into the public domain precludes resort to another federal intellectual property
statute, the Lanham Trademarks Act, to achieve a de facto prolongation of exclusive
copyright-like rights.”).
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argued for reversal primarily based on public domain arguments.175 These
arguments did appear to have some influence on Justice Scalia’s opinion: the
Court explicitly stated that creating a right of authorial attribution under
trademark law would have the detrimental effect of regulating the free use of
public domain materials under a “species of mutant copyright law.”176 The
public domain is generally equated with the absence of intellectual property
regulations, so there is clearly some truth in seeing Dastar as a victory for the
public domain. But in the case of intellectual property laws that prevent
consumer deception, the absence of regulation does not always serve the public
interest. In any event, the brief nod toward the public domain did not seem to
be the driving force behind the Dastar decision.177 No subsequent district
court decisions have accorded this language much consequence and all courts
to consider the issue have been willing to extend Dastar’s holding to works not
in the public domain.178
A second notable view in the scholarly commentary is that the Court’s
opinion in Dastar rested on an erroneous conclusion of “amateur psychology,”
namely a faulty empirical belief that consumers didn’t actually care about the

175 Professor Tyler T. Ochoa filed an amicus brief on behalf of himself and other law
professors. See Tyler T. Ochoa, Brief Amici Curiae of Intellectual Property Law Professors
in Support of Dastar Corporation, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 931, 931 (2004). Professor Malla
Pollack also submitted a brief on behalf of herself and nine legal scholars. See Pollack,
supra note 165.
176 The full sentence reads:
Assuming for the sake of argument that Dastar’s representation of itself as the
“[p]roducer” of its videos amounted to a representation that it originated the creative
work conveyed by the videos, allowing a cause of action under § 43(a) for that
representation would create a species of mutant copyright law that limits the public’s
“federal right to ‘copy and to use,’” expired copyrights.
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34 (citations omitted and emphasis added). Note that “mutant copyright
law” precedes the description of the effects of the putative monstrosity on the public
domain. Evidently the “mutant copyright” language was borrowed from the petitioner’s
brief, which was co-authored by UCLA law professor David Nimmer. See Nimmer, supra
note 18, at 60 (“Happily for Justice Scalia (as well as for the U.S. justice system), his own
opinion in Dastar eliminates any right to maintain that those words in the Court’s opinion
represent reverse passing off, thus forestalling my colleagues and me from calling him to the
bar!”).
177 But see Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 269 (“Despite this so-far unflinching application
of Dastar to still-copyrighted works, one should recognize that the rationale behind the
Supreme Court’s rejection of attribution rights in copyright-expired works does not extend
to copyright-protected works.”); Patchen M. Haggerty, Authors’ Claims for Reverse Passing
Off Under the Lanham Act after Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
FINDLAW, Mar. 22, 2004, http://library.findlaw.com/2004/Mar/22/133354.html (“As
evidenced by the foregoing analysis of the rationale underlying the Court’s Dastar decision,
the Court’s holding is only meant to preclude a claim for Reverse Passing Off under the
Lanham Act for works that are in the public domain.”).
178 See supra note 168 (listing notable cases that have cited to Dastar).
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creative authorship of the products they purchase.179 The evidence generally
cited is the following statement:
The consumer who buys a branded product does not automatically
assume that the brand-name company is the same entity that came up with
the idea for the product, or designed the product – and typically does not
care whether it is. The words of the Lanham Act should not be stretched
to cover matters that are typically of no consequence to purchasers.180
This does seem strange. Obviously, from the perspective of those
purchasing many works of authorship, this statement is simply wrong. Most
fiction consumers do not purchase books based on the identity of the
publishing house, they purchase on the basis of, among other things, the
author. (Other factors may include the subject matter, the book reviews, and
perhaps how pretty the cover is.) The problem with placing too much emphasis
on amateur psychology here is that the Court itself acknowledges, in the very
next paragraph, that the observation does not hold true in the case of
communicative works. The Court’s statement about the cares of consumers is
probably missing a “generally” – it is true about the consumers of most
products protected by trademark law. In the special case of creative works,
however, the Court itself stated:
The purchaser of a novel is interested not merely, if at all, in the identity
of the producer of the physical tome (the publisher), but also, and indeed
primarily, in the identity of the creator of the story it conveys (the
author). And the author, of course, has at least as much interest in
avoiding passing-off (or reverse passing-off) of his creation as does the
publisher. For such a communicative product (the argument goes) “origin
of goods” in § 43(a) must be deemed to include not merely the producer
of the physical item (the publishing house Farrar, Straus and Giroux, or
the video producer Dastar) but also the creator of the content that the
physical item conveys (the author Tom Wolfe, or – assertedly –
respondents).
The problem with this argument according special treatment to
communicative products is that it causes the Lanham Act to conflict with
the law of copyright, which addresses that subject specifically. 181
The court further observed that
179

See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Seventh Annual Honorable Helen Wilson Nies
Memorial Lecture in Intellectual Property Law: The Trademark Jurisprudence of the
Rehnquist Court, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 204 (2004); Hughes, supra note 18, at
33 (observing that Justice Scalia “tells us a strange tale about the psychology of
consumers”); Marshall Leafer, Life After Eldred: The Supreme Court and the Future of
Copyright, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1597, 1614 (2004) (“I am particularly interested in
knowing the author’s name and I suspect many others hold a similar view.”).
180 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33.
181 Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
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as used in the Lanham Act, the phrase “origin of goods” is in our view
incapable of connoting the person or entity that originated the ideas or
communications that ‘goods’ embody or contain. Such an extension
would not only stretch the text, but it would be out of accord with the
history and purpose of the Lanham Act and inconsistent with
precedent.182
Clearly, the Court recognized that consumers often care about authorship,
and that the purchaser of a creative artifact may even care primarily about
authorship. However, the central holding of Dastar – and the holding
understood by district court opinions applying Dastar – is that the “the
producer of the physical tome” is permitted to look to trademark law for
misattribution protections, whereas “the creator of the story it conveys (the
author)” must use copyright law.183
A final notable argument found in the secondary commentary is that the
Dastar ruling might be limited in scope because claims of “false advertising”
might still be used to address authorial misattributions. My first concern with
this possibility is that the Court speaks generally, throughout the opinion, of
trademark law and the scope of “§ 43(a).” False advertising under the Lanham
Act is a part of “§ 43(a).”184 At one point, the opinion does state that a claim
under § 43(a)(1)(B) might be viable under certain circumstances in relation to
claims about the content of a communicative product.185 But this language
deserves careful attention, because it doesn’t seem to go far enough to protect
against authorial misattribution. The exact situation the Court identifies as
actionable under § 43(a)(1)(B) is a situation where “the producer of a video
that substantially copied the Crusade series were, in advertising or promotion,
to give purchasers the impression that the video was quite different from that
series.”186
This hypothetical situation seems highly unlikely as a practical matter. Why
would anyone, especially someone seeking to misattribute authorship, want to
claim, in advertising or promotion of the work, that the misattributed work
being offered is “quite different” from a prior work that is, in fact, nearly
identical? Has there ever been any creative work, in any genre, promoted and
advertised as being “quite different” from another particular work that is a
nearly identical copy? The Court’s hypothetical situation concerns an
affirmative claim of “difference” that has little to do with reality. But more
important, it has little to do with claims of authorship.
Yet, as stated previously, some very erudite commentators have held out the
possibility that the issues presented by Dastar might be resolved by looking to

182
183
184
185
186

Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
Id. at 33.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2000).
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 38.
Id.
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the niceties of pleading.187 Fox should have claimed misattribution under the
false advertising provisions of the trademark law, § 43(a)(1)(B), instead of
section § 43(a)(1)(A), which addresses confusion over the origin of goods.
While it is possible that some subsequent district court interpreting Dastar
might take this approach, it hasn’t happened yet. Instead, courts have spoken
broadly about § 43(a) and Dastar’s tangibility limitations.188

187

See Nimmer, supra note 18, at 44 & n.255 (suggesting that affirmative authorial
misattributions are still actionable pursuant to § 43(a)(1)(B) where the attribution claims
made are of consequence to purchasers, and thanking Professor McCarthy for “elucidating
this point”). But see Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Co., 286 F. Supp. 2d 969, 972
(N.D. Ill. 2003) (“As a backup argument, Bretford contends that Smith was guilty of ‘false
advertising’ . . . . But Dastar blocks that argument as well.”); 2 MCCARTHY § 10.26.1,
supra note 100, at 10-63 (rather carefully stating that after Dastar, “to trigger Lanham Act §
43(a) claims, false claims of creation of the intellectual property content of a product must
fit within the false advertising prong of § 43(a)(1)(B)”); Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 269
(“Whether or not the actor or I can still allege false designation of origin, the Dastar Court’s
reference to subsisting section 43(a)(1)(B) claims . . . may in some instances preserve a
Lanham Act right of action for authors and performers.”).
188 See, e.g., Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. World Trade Sys., Inc., 379 F.3d 131, 149 (5th
Cir. 2004) (“GUS has not accused HAL of taking tangible copies of its software, removing
its trademarks, and selling them as its own. Rather, GUS asserts that HAL copied the ideas,
concepts, structures, and sequences embodied in its copyrighted work . . . . Dastar makes
clear that such claims are not actionable under § 43(a).”); Bob Creeden & Assocs. v.
Infosoft, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d 876, 879-80 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (dismissing a Lanham Act claim
based on misattribution of a software program because the system at issue was the allegedly
infringing copy of the plaintiff’s software system, not the original software itself); Tao of
Sys. Integration, Inc. v. Analytical Servs. & Materials, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 565, 572 (E.D.
Va. 2004) (finding that misattributed ideas and concepts in a proposal did not violate the
Lanham Act because the allegedly misattributive proposal was physically produced by the
defendant); Larkin Group, Inc. v. Aquatic Design Consultants, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1121,
1126 (D. Kan. 2004) (finding unaccredited copying of proposals was not a violation of the
Lanham Act, and commenting that “[e]ven if plaintiff authored some of the ideas and
concepts embodied in those proposals, the Lanham Act does not provide protection for such
plagiarism”); Smith v. New Line Cinema, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18382, at **9-10
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2004) (“As the Supreme Court recently made clear, the Lanham Act
protects only ‘the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not . . . the
author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods.’ . . . In light of
Dastar, Smith, as the alleged author of the screenplay embodied in the tangible good offered
for sale, is not the originator of the film.”) (citations omitted); Schiffer Publ’g, Ltd. v.
Chronicle Books, LLC, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16180, at *11 (E.D. Pa. August 11, 2004)
(“[B]ecause Defendants are the physical producers – the fabricators, so to speak . . . they
cannot be held liable under § 43(a)(1)(A) even if they are not the creators of the pictures at
issue.”); Carroll v. Kahn, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17902, at **16-17 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 9,
2003) (interpreting reverse passing off under the Lanham Act to be limited to cases
involving the tangible goods actually produced by the plaintiff); Boston Int’l Music, Inc. v.
Austin, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16240, at *4 (D. Mass. Sept. 12, 2003) (finding “reverse
passing off” to be limited to cases involving tangible goods and “declin[ing] to construe §
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This brings us back to the language about tangibility. It is hard to accept
that the Supreme Court could have meant to draw such a bright, radical, and
theoretically destabilizing line between copyright and trademark, yet
subsequent district court opinions suggest that Dastar has removed authorial
attribution protections from the scope of trademark law – because authorship is
intangible.189 Perhaps the better reading of the opinion would be to limit it to
cases involving “communicative products.”190 Perhaps the best subset of the
possible scope of “tangibility” would be to restrict the limit of Dastar to
information products potentially covered by copyright law. If Dastar is, at its
core, about placing authorial misattribution concerns in the realm of copyright
law (and this seems to be a plausible reading), this approach may be a way of
cabining its scope. But if copyright now governs authorial attribution, what
does that mean for society? The next section addresses this question.
C.

Misattribution and Copyright
The [copyright] law was designed as a deterrent to plagiarism.191

According to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Dastar, copyright law is the
constitutional and statutory vehicle that addresses the attribution of works of
creative authorship.192 Justice Scalia said that copyright speaks to authorial
attribution “specifically.”193 While Justice Scalia was clearly thinking of a
43(a) of the Lanham Act to require attribution to plaintiff [and alleged co-author] Johnson
for ‘I Like It,’ where the defendants here are the ‘origin’ of the product they recorded,
produced, and sold on their own.”); Williams v. UMG Recordings, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18400, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2003) (“Plaintiff would have a claim if Defendants
purchased copies of Plaintiff’s goods (i.e. the film) and repackaged them as their own. By
contrast, Plaintiff does not have a claim for his authorship and direction embodied in that
film. His claim, therefore, is barred as a matter of law.”).
189 See supra note 188 (listing notable lower court interpretations of Dastar). There are
many reasons this distinction makes no sense, but the most obvious is that trademark law
regularly protects trademark rights in relation to the provision of services, which may be
intangible.
190 But see Bretford Mfg,, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 971-72 (finding that defendant’s sale of a
table that incorporated a leg from plaintiff’s table was not reverse passing off because
Dastar’s holding was not limited to “communicative products”).
191 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 393 (1940). The language
is taken from the syllabus, though the opinion also seems to conflate those who infringe
copyrights with plagiarists. Id. at 405 (“Petitioners stress the point that respondents have
been found guilty of deliberate plagiarism . . . .”).
192 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003)
(interpreting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8).
193 Id. It is clear in the context of the opinion that Justice Scalia was thinking of the
Visual Artists Rights Act, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000), as the section of the
copyright statute that “addresses that subject.” As discussed in this section, that Act is a
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narrow provision in the copyright statute – the Visual Artist Rights Act
(“VARA”) – it might not seem odd for a member of the public to think that
copyright would be the proper statutory regime that would address the
misattribution of authorship.194 After all, copyright law is often associated in
the popular mind with prohibiting and policing plagiarism. The writer of the
syllabus in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., an often-cited Supreme
Court copyright opinion from 1940, clearly believed this to be the case.195
Yet contrary to the impression one might gain from reading the many
judicial opinions that conflate copyright infringement with plagiarism, there is
actually no law prohibiting plagiarism and misattribution generally.196 While
the copyright statute spells out in voluminous (some might say agonizing)
detail the specific quasi-proprietary rights related to the performance,
reproduction, broadcast, and display of expressions via particular methods and
technologies, it almost entirely ignores attribution interests.197 Unlike
European copyright regimes, which grant “moral rights” to authors, the
copyright law of the United States ignores the attribution concerns of authors
almost entirely.198
1.

The Meaning of VARA

One significant exception to this is found in the provisions of VARA that
Justice Scalia apparently had in mind. VARA is generally recognized as an
effort on the part of the United States to come into greater compliance with
“moral rights” treaty obligations pursuant to the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.199 On March 1, 1989, the United
States was required to recognize and implement a legal order where,
small exception to the general rule that copyright does not speak to attribution interests.
194 See Green, supra note 25, at 200 (noting how “copyright infringement is sometimes
loosely referred to by courts as ‘plagiarism’”).
195 Sheldon, 309 U.S. at 393.
196 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 36 (explaining that the courts have not recognized plagiarism
generally as a prohibited act); Green, supra note 25, at 171; Kwall, supra note 5, at 955
(explaining that copyright law does not specifically protect against misattribution); cf.
Saunders, supra note 172, at 161 (summarizing Dastar as follows: “[t]he Lanham Act does
not provide a claim for trademark infringement for what is essentially an act of plagiarism”).
Indeed, the absence of a clear remedy for “plagiarism” has been the case for quite a while.
See Henry Goudy, Plagiarism: A Fine Art, 20 JURID. REV. 302, 302 (1909) (“In its modern
sense plagiarism cannot be said to be a crime punishable either by English or Scottish law,
or, so far as I am aware, by any European code.”).
197 17 U.S.C. § 101-106 (2000) (setting forth exclusive rights).
198 See Gulick, supra note 113, at 91-92 (comparing and contrasting European and
American approaches to copyright); Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the
Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 2 (1994); Suhl, supra note 129, at 1203-15 (comparing
VARA with moral rights protections in European law).
199 See Hughes, supra note 18.
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independently of an author’s economic rights, the law would protect an
author’s “right to claim authorship of the work” and certain other “moral
rights.”200 VARA was enacted the subsequent year.201 Clearly there is good
reason to suspect a causal link here, and the legislative history of VARA fully
supports such a connection.202 It has been claimed that the enactment of
VARA was needed for full compliance with the Berne Convention.203
However, it has also been claimed that VARA was narrowly drafted because
United States compliance with Berne had been substantially achieved though
protections afforded by other regimes of law, most notably the trademark
protections that existed prior to Dastar.204 The current status of United States
compliance with Berne is therefore unclear. 205
But whatever the reasons for VARA’s enactment, VARA protects authorial
attribution and “moral rights” only for a very limited set of works: namely,
original works by visual artists who produce single works, limited edition
prints, or sculptural casting in editions of less than 200.206 As a practical
matter, this limitation essentially ensured that VARA would serve to protect
the idealized “fine artists” who sell physically original paintings and sculptures
in small galleries, but would leave the hugely profitable commercial copyright
industries (e.g., publishing, film, music, and software) untouched.207 Outside
200 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supra note 51
(“Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any
distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”); see generally Hughes,
supra note 18.
201 H.R. Rep. No. 101-514 at 24 (1990) (reporting bill’s passage by the Judiciary
Committee); Netanel, supra note 198, at 4.
202 See H.R. Rep. No. 101-514 at 7-10 (describing how VARA was prompted by U.S.
accession to the Berne Convention).
203 See, e.g., Suhl, supra note 198, at 1215 (summarizing VARA as a United States
concession to Berne that “grants a bundle of Moral Rights to a limited group of visual
artists”).
204 See Corey Field, Berne Goes to the Movies, COPYRIGHT WORLD, July-Aug. 2003, at
23, 24-25.
205 This is an interesting issue that I will leave to others to explore. See id. (noting the
potential conflict between the holding in Dastar and the Berne Convention); Hughes, supra
note 18.
206 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining “work of visual art”); 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000)
(providing special protections for such works).
207 Cross, supra note 20, at 735 (“[VARA] is too narrow to serve as a general source of
Reverse Passing Off.”). It should be noted that not all gallery artists are protected. For
instance, the works of Thomas Kinkade, “Painter of Light,” are reproduced in copious
numbers and thus would probably not qualify as being “work[s] of visual art” under the
statute despite the fact that they are displayed and sold in galleries. See 17 U.S.C. § 101;
The Official Thomas Kinkade Website, http://www.thomaskinkade.com (last visited Aug.
12, 2005).
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the limited context of VARA works, copyright law has not protected
attribution interests at all.208 Thus, Justice Scalia’s statement that § 43(a) of
the Lanham Act is incapable of speaking to authorial attribution because
copyright “addresses that subject specifically” is a very powerful statement
regarding the current status of attribution interests: it suggests that there are
virtually no such protections (except for visual artists producing limited edition
or unique works) and that this is by design.209
However, it is unclear exactly what Justice Scalia was saying when he spoke
of the conflict between copyright and trademark. If he was attempting to
interpret what Congress had intended when it passed or amended the Lanham
Act, it is hard to follow how the Congressional passage of special attribution
protections for a discrete subset of original artistic works in 1990 somehow
illuminated the intent of Congress in the passage of the original version of §
43(a) of the Lanham Act in 1946 (or later major amendments to § 43(a) made
in 1988). And if the notion was that VARA was intended to clarify the limited
federal regulation of authorial attribution (and preempt any other efforts to
regulate attribution), the legislative history of VARA makes this a very strange
proposition. It has been cogently argued that the legislative history of VARA
suggests that the Lanham Act § 43(a) protections were considered important to
meeting the country’s obligations under the Berne Convention.210 The
existence of alternative avenues of relief for authors makes a fairly good
explanation for the very limited scope of VARA’s attribution protections.
There doesn’t seem to be any support for the contention that Congress enacted
VARA with the intent to entirely occupy the field of authorial attribution
protections.211

208 Professor Jane Ginsburg and Justin Hughes have both suggested that the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act may also protect attribution interests by outlawing intentional
removals of “copyright management information” that is conveyed in connection with the
work. See Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 283; Hughes, supra note 18, at 16; see also 17 U.S.C.
1202(c) (2000). This is an interesting observation, but, as of this writing, it has apparently
not been utilized or endorsed by a court. See Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 283-86 (failing to
cite any cases endorsing this approach).
209 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003).
210 See Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 281-82 (explaining U.S. obligations under the Berne
Convention); Hughes, supra note 18, at 3 (describing the Lanham Act as the “keystone” of
U.S. compliance with the Berne Convention).
211 The most plausible (and, at the same time, the most radical) reading of the conflict
would be one that did not focus on Congressional intent, but on some form of constitutional
preemption instead. The import of this reading, however, would be extremely destabilizing
for numerous other areas of law. For instance, it could conceivably affect other noncopyright schemes protecting authorship rights, including state laws concerning
misappropriation and rights of publicity. See, e.g., Toney v. L’Oreal, Inc., 406 F.3d 905,
908-09 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that the Illinois right of publicity statute is not preempted by
the Copyright Act based on Congressional intent, but not reaching the constitutional
preemption analysis, which might have altered the outcome).
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Copyright as Collateral Attribution Protection

Yet even if copyright doesn’t explicitly speak to attribution outside of
VARA, does this mean that copyright law does not address attribution? It
might be argued that copyright protects attribution in a collateral fashion. By
protecting works of creative authorship as property, copyright enables the
contractual protection of attribution. If an author can control the dissemination
and reproduction of her work pursuant to copyright law, copyright law will
grant her the contractual leverage to protect her attribution interests. In fact,
this doesn’t follow nearly as neatly as one might assume, for two essential
reasons. First, if we think attribution should be about providing incentives to
authors, the fact is that copyright as property does not always provide any
attribution-related incentives to people who we would ordinarily identify as
authors. Second, social attribution interests are not necessarily aligned with or
served by “attribution rights” that are exclusively granted to authors.
Taking the first issue, the Supreme Court in Dastar seemed to argue that
there is an inherent difficulty in fixing credit for authorship. In refusing to
hold that an author could be held to be the “origin” of a work under the
Lanham Act, Justice Scalia stated:
Without a copyrighted work as the basepoint, the word “origin” has no
discernable limits. A video of the MGM film Carmen Jones, after its
copyright has expired, would presumably require attribution not just to
MGM, but to Oscar Hammerstein II (who wrote the musical on which the
film was based), to Georges Bizet (who wrote the opera on which the
musical was based), and to Prosper Mérimée (who wrote the novel on
which the opera was based). In many cases, figuring out who is in the
line of “origin” would be no simple task.212
The Court is right that determining authorship is “no simple task.” But is
this fatal to the project? Copyright law, by granting an initial monopoly
reproduction and performance interest exclusively to “authors” who originate
creative works has long had to struggle with the difficulty of determining who
is an author that originates a work. In cases such as Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,213 the Supreme Court had to determine who was
the “author” of a photograph – the photographer or the subject. This was “no
simple task,” but it was managed.214 The Supreme Court and lower courts

212

Dastar, 539 U.S. at 35. It is worth noting how closely Scalia’s refusal to accept the
very concept of original authorship in this passage seems to comport with the abovementioned post-structuralist criticisms of authorship and originality. See, e.g., Boyle, supra
note 49, at 642-43 (questioning whether attempts to ascertain the intent of the framers can
guide constitutional interpretation in light of post-structuralist critiques). This seems
somewhat ironic given Justice Scalia’s well-known hermeneutic inclinations.
213 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
214 Id. at 58-59 (holding that the photographer, not the subject, was the author of a
photograph).
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have regularly engaged in non-simple tasks without throwing their hands in the
air.
The end result of all this cogitation, however, has not led to anything simple.
Instead, the result – predictably – has been to transform what was a vague
social concept of authorship into a legal term of art that is governed largely by
case law and statutory provisions. The legal definition of “author” has
diverged substantially from its popular definition. A legal “author” may, in
some cases, be an employer who hires an employee to create a work.215
Copyright in such a case protects the employer-author’s interest, but not the
employee’s interest. The definition of “author” is further clouded in the case
of collectively authored works. A “joint work” under the copyright statute is
“a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole.”216 However, because the statute does not define the term “author” in
the first place, it is unclear how wide the circle of joint authorship should be
drawn in copyright law. In some cases it is drawn, like the work for hire
provisions, inconsistently with popular understandings of authorship.217
The divergence between legal and popular constructions of the notion of
authorship is perhaps best illustrated by the Ninth Circuit case of
In that case, Spike Lee employed Denzel
Aalmuhammed v. Lee.218
Washington to play the role of Malcolm X in the eponymous film.219
Washington turned for advice to Muslim scholar Jefri Aalmuhammed, who
eventually (and without a “work for hire” agreement), re-wrote passages of the

215 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (setting forth various definitions but failing to define
“authors”); cf. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2000) (stating that an employer can be “considered the
author”); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) (defining a
“work for hire” in terms of an author’s employment status); Erickson v. Trinity Theatre,
Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1067-69 (7th Cir. 1994); see also 17 U.S.C. §101 (defining a “joint
work”): 17 U.S.C. § 201 (“In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person
for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and,
unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them,
owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.”).
216 17 U.S.C. § 101. Some courts have imposed an additional requirement that the
contributions of each “joint author” should be sufficiently original and expressive to be
subject to copyright separately. See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 506-07 (2d Cir.
1991) (discussing cases that explore the concept of a “joint work”); Mary LaFrance,
Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive Collaborator: Preserving the Rights of Joint
Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193, 196 (2001) (presenting alternate tests to determine if a joint
work exists).
217 See generally F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of
Motion Pictures Under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 225 (2001).
218 202 F.3d 1227, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 1999) (establishing a narrow definition of “joint
work” for motion pictures).
219 Id. at 1229.
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film script and added new scenes and characters.220 Despite Aalmuhammed’s
clear creative contribution to the collective enterprise of the movie, the Ninth
Circuit found that Mr. Aalmuhammed was not an author of the movie, because
his role was too indirect to be considered “authorial.”221 The court found,
instead, that the sole author of the film was the film company, pursuant to
work for hire agreements.222
Many scholars have expressed discomfort with the result in
Aalmuhammed.223 For instance, Martha Woodmansee has suggested that the
Aalmuhammed case demonstrates the continuing vitality of a “romantic notion
of authorship” that ignores collaborative creativity and instead gives legal
primacy to a quasi-mythological notion of the artist as a solitary genius.224
Many others have criticized the mythology of the “romantic author” as a
means to expose what they see as a flawed ideology animating the copyright
statute.225 Whatever one makes of these critiques, the Aalmuhammed case and
the work for hire doctrine reveal that the notion of authorship in copyright law
and the notion of authorship in popular culture can be incongruent. Copyright
law at times seems willing to provide counter-intuitive determinations of who
is a legal author, and thus entitled to legal ownership and proprietary control of
creative works. If one believes there is a societal interest in accurate
attribution, copyright’s scheme of authorship ordering is obviously problematic
because the legal author controlling attribution is not the person society views
as the author.226 Jefri Aalmuhammed clearly has no ability at this point, via
copyright law, to control how Warner Brothers decides to attribute the scenes
he authored (but did not legally author). Even thought he did not contribute to
the film under the standard work for hire contract, he was still found to lack a
220

Id. at 1231-32.
The court’s reasoning was notably tautological. See id. at 1235 (“Too open a
definition of author would compel authors to insulate themselves and maintain ignorance of
the contributions others might make.”). In other words, in order to effectively encourage
authors to work together, not all authors can be authors.
222 Id. at 1235 (“Warner Brothers required Spike Lee to sign a ‘work for hire’ agreement,
so that even Lee would not be a co-author and co-owner with Warner Brothers.”).
223 See Dougherty, supra note 217, at 325 (discussing the unfairness and possible
economic inefficiency of the joint authorship doctrine); Martha Woodmansee, Response to
David Nimmer, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 231, 234-35 (2001) (critiquing the underlying theory of
authorship in the Aalmuhammed case).
224 Id. at 234 (using the case as an example in the course of “defend[ing] the continuing
relevance of literary studies in the discourse of copyright”).
225 Theories regarding the intersection of romantic authorship, copyright, and literary
theory enjoyed a heyday of sorts in the early 1990s. See generally supra note 60; cf. Jane
Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1866 (1990) (critiquing various assertions with regard to the
rationales animating copyright law).
226 Gulick, supra note 113, at 66 (“What does it mean to have an author who is not the
creator of his work?”).
221
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proprietary interest in his creative contributions to the film.
3.

The Attribution/Copyright Mismatch

This is not to say that the Aalmuhammed case reached the wrong result as an
issue of social policy. If the case is understood as deciding the proper
proprietary control of the copyright in the film Malcolm X, it may well reach
the right result. There are legitimate reasons, related to economic efficiency,
that copyright law might attempt to shift copyright ownership from the hands
of a diverse set of contributors (including those like Jefri Aalmuhammed) to
single “dominant” employers and authors.227 To the extent copyright law
evinces a coherent theory, it is best understood in the United States as a system
designed for the purpose of maximizing the generation and popular distribution
of new works.228 It can be argued that shifting ownership of copyright into the
hands of an eager and well-financed exploiter that funds production is the best
way of ensuring the distribution of the collaborative works to markets. If we
see authorship simply as a system for efficiently parceling out proprietary
ownership rights, the law should grant ownership (denoting it as “authorship”)
to the most efficient distributors and exploiters of works. Again, the problem
with this model – from the standpoint of attribution – is that the non-statutory,
non-dominant author lacks the control to secure attribution.
Even where authors have nominal control over the copyright in their work,
the problem of misattribution is not solved. There are several reasons for this.
First, authors may suffer from unequal bargaining power vis-à-vis publishers
and distributors. Compared to the commercial publishers and exploiters of
creative material, aspiring authors are generally impecunious and legally
unsophisticated. The established industry players, secure veterans of the
process, can generally exert their greater power to obtain written assignments
of copyright in exchange for negotiated compensation. After an author
alienates the copyright in a creative work, the United States copyright statute
generally provides few mechanisms for that author to reclaim control over the
exploitation of the work. (VARA is an exception to this rule.229) Again this
accords well with a utilitarian, property-centric view of copyright. By
minimizing encumbrances restricting subsequent exploitation, copyright, in

227
But see Dougherty, supra note 217, at 324-25 (arguing that a liability rule would be
more efficient than a property rule).
228 Tom W. Bell, Authors’ Welfare: Copyright as a Statutory Mechanism for
Redistributing Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 238 (2003) (arguing that “copyright aims to
alleviate the market’s failure to give adequate incentives for producing expressive works”);
Green, supra note 25, at 202 (noting that copyright law protects primarily economic
interests).
229 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000). The mechanism of statutory termination rights are another
way authors might reclaim proprietary control of their work, but the mechanism only comes
into play several decades after the work’s creation. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c) (2000)
(allowing authors to reclaim rights during certain periods after having sold those rights).
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theory, enables the alienation of a maximum amount of authorial interests in
order to maximize authorial incentives. By maximizing the amount of control
that authors may transfer, the law maximizes the value of the work that can be
transferred for payment. Of course, in cases of unequal bargaining power, and
in cases where third parties can suffer from the effects of private transactions,
the simple goal of maximizing the power of free markets can be questioned.
A second problem with relying on authors to use copyright to obtain
attribution is that a copyright exists only for a limited period.230 When
copyright lapses, the ability to police against misattribution also fades away.
Even assuming Shakespeare once had a copyright that he would have asserted
to protect against misattribution, the plagiarism of Shakespeare today would
fall outside the scope of attribution protections. From the standpoint of
incentives for Shakespeare to produce new works (the concern of copyright),
this is just fine. Shakespeare is dead. From the standpoint of the social
distribution of his works this is also fine. Fewer restraints will lead to greater
distribution. But from the standpoint of consumer protection with regard to
misattribution, it is a problem. This concern about the social effects of
misleading communication is why trademark interests, unlike copyright
interests, have no temporal limitations.231
Finally, and perhaps most seriously, policing attribution by using authorial
control has a glaring structural defect. Authors often have incentives to
misattribute creative authorship, deceiving society as to the authorship of
creative work when this deception can provide them with benefits. This
possibility will be explored in more detail in Part III.
D.

Misrepresentation and Other Legal Mechanisms

Of course, even in the absence of copyright and trademark protections, there
still exist private causes of action that regulate the use of authorial attributions
in ways that contribute to the protection of societal interests. For instance,
there are numerous state statutory vehicles that permit actions against parties
that engage in commercial fraud or misrepresentation. In the case of consumer
purchases of deceptively attributed works of authorship, such claims would
hardly be worth the cost of a legal complaint for individual purchasers. If
aggregated in a class action vehicle, however, they might have some chance of
succeeding.232

230

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 192-93 (2003) (citing
the Constitution’s Copyright Clause in upholding Congress’s power to extend the term of
copyright).
231 See 3 MCCARTHY § 24.03[2], supra note 100, at 24-13 (describing the purposes of
trademark law).
232 The class action vehicle is obviously a whole issue of its own. It is worth noting,
though, that in at least one case where a class action strategy was attempted to remedy an
authorial misattribution, it proved unsuccessful. For a discussion of the misattributions of
authorship engaged in by the band Milli Vanilli, see Freedman v. Arista Records, Inc., 137
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The most obvious possibility, however, is one that has been employed
successfully by authors in the past: rights of publicity.233 Many state laws
recognize a quasi-proprietary right of publicity that permits a cause of action in
cases where a party makes an unauthorized use of a person’s identity for
commercial purposes.234 These state rights of publicity could be effective in
policing attributional concerns.235 Where Party A claims that a seller has
“passed off” a creative work by claiming that it was authored by A, when it
was in fact authored by B, Party B appears to be exploiting Party A’s identity
for commercial benefit.236 In instances where an author’s name is used without

F.R.D. 225, 227-28 (E.D. Pa. 1991):
Stating that nowhere on the outer covering of the album package do the names of
Morvan and Pilatus appear, [defendant] avers that plaintiffs have assumed incorrectly
that 7,000,000 persons purchased albums because Morvan and Pilatus were perceived
as the actual singers. Defendants submit that individual testimony of each class
member would be necessary to determine on what basis he or she made the purchase
because the gravamen of the complaint is fraud. Essential to the claim of fraud is proof
of reliance which may vary greatly among purchasers.
See also id. at 229 (“What causes a person to respond positively to a performance is a
complex matter, especially in these modern times where popular musical performances
involve visual as well as auditory stimulation.”).
233 See Mark A. Lemley, Rights of Attribution and Integrity in Online Communications,
1995 J. ONLINE. L. art. 2.
234 The theoretical foundation of the right of publicity is unclear. It originally stemmed
from prohibitions against tortious invasions of privacy. Currently, it seems to sound in the
proprietary concerns of copyright, but obviously can be employed in “sponsorship”
circumstances highly similar to those which give rise to unfair competition claims. See J.
Thomas McCarthy & Paul M. Anderson, Protection of the Athlete’s Identity: The Right of
Publicity, Endorsements and Domain Names, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 195, 198 (2000)
(“The right of publicity is not a kind of trademark. It is not just a species of copyright. And
it is not merely another kind of privacy right. It is none of these things, although it bears
some family resemblance to all three.”). For a well-known critique of the right, see Michael
Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL.
L. REV. 125, 178-237 (1993). For a response, see Kwall, supra note 25, at 3.
235 But this is not always a certainty by any means. For instance, in the Follett case, the
New York Civil Rights law was found inapplicable to the situation, because Ken Follett
gave permission to use his name and did not have a copyright in the underlying work. See
Follett v. New Am. Library, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 304, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Another
interesting possibility would be a claim of defamation, if the misattributed work was
sufficiently damaging to an author’s reputation.
236 See, e.g., Winterland Concessions Co. v. MacIntosh, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9917, at
*25 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 1992) (finding that the sale of t-shirts bearing performer names such
as “John Cougar Mellencamp” violated both Section 43(a) and rights of publicity). See also
David W. Melville & Harvey S. Perlman, Protection for Works of Authorship Through the
Law of Unfair Competition: Right of Publicity and Common Law Copyright Reconsidered,
42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 363, 392-93 (1998) (noting the historical expansion of publicity rights
to cover distinguishing features like a singer’s voice); Pinover, supra note 40, at 54-63
(explaining the similarities and differences between state publicity rights and attribution
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permission to sell a work of creative authorship that he did not create, authors
can assert rights of publicity, and such claims have been successful.237 Yet
rights of publicity as a mechanism for attribution protection have problems
similar to those addressed above with regard to copyright. Because rights of
publicity are often conceived of as something in the nature of property
interests, they can effectively allow name “owners” the freedom to manipulate
usages of authorial attribution.238 In other words, because concerns about
consumer deception are not at all integral to the theory of rights of publicity,239
it would raise no red flags under the right of publicity for A to license B to sell
a book attributed to A but written by B. If one believes authorial attribution
protections are simply a matter of parceling out certain absolute grants to
authors, rights of publicity seem to protect authorial rights fairly effectively (at
least in the case of direct “passing off”). Yet the protection of societal interests
in accurate attribution is entirely ignored.
In Part III, I will briefly delve into the dilemmas raised by private market
orderings of proprietary rights in attribution and credit. My concern is that
such systems, post-Dastar, may come to dominate and displace trademarkbased theories. Indeed, this is not so much a speculative concern as it is the
current state of affairs. If we seek to protect social interests in accurate
authorial attribution, no amount of copyright, rights of publicity, or proprietary
“moral rights” will fully correct the problems raised by Dastar. Indeed,
handing out more property rights to more authorial owners may ultimately
make things worse for society. Until and unless we look to trademark’s antideception theories to fix the result of Dastar, awarding new attribution “rights”
will simply introduce a new stripe of property-like protection to an already
crowded (arguably overcrowded, overcomplicated, and under-theorized) field
of law.

claims under the Lanham Act).
237 See, e.g., Winterland Concessions, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9917, at *25.
238 Pinover, supra note 40 (“Publicity rights do not have the same economic utility as
trademarks. If consumers are not misled, there is no confusion in the product content
conveyed to the consumer, and therefore, the consumer is not better able to predict anything
about the product. Without consumer predictability, consistent quality in the product is not
encouraged. . . . Courts are justifiably cautious when dealing with a celebrity monopoly in
an image.”); id. at 63 (arguing that consumer utility is enhanced by trademark protections
for attribution, but is not enhanced by monopolistic proprietary schemes such as rights to
publicity and moral rights).
239 See Estate of V.C. Andrews v. United States, 850 F. Supp. 1279, 1292-96 (E.D. Va.
1994) (using the principle of publicity rights to determine the value of an estate, but not
taking into account the use of the deceased Andrews’s name by another author as part of the
publicity rights analysis); McCarthy & Anderson, supra note 234, at 201 & n.39 (noting that
“deception or false endorsement is not required to prove a case of infringement of the right
of publicity”).
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III. AUTHORSHIP, CONSUMERS, AND COLLABORATION
How can we know the dancer from the dance? 240
In this Part, I will be looking at specific practices of authorial misattribution
and fluid crediting. There are three points that I wish to make. First,
attribution-shifting practices often occur in the marketing of information
products for simple economic reasons. Second, there is a real potential for
consumer deception in such practices, because authorial attribution, unlike a
trademark, often points directly to a particular and relevant factual proposition
about the circumstances of production and the qualities of a product. Third,
some degree of this type of credit shifting is inevitable simply because there
are significant limits in how far trademark can and should protect attributions
of authorship. In the case of large-scale collaborative productions and in the
case of authorship confusion that is intrinsic to a work, misattributions of
individual authorship are probably not worth the social effort of policing.
However the “authorship” in such cases lacks much of the unique value that
has been discussed previously in this article. The associations of the names of
directors and actors with large-scale collaborative film projects is not so much
an issue of authorial attribution as it is a standard trademark issue of
sponsorship and branding.
In order to explore these points, I will look at a few specific instances of
credit-shifting practices in the promotion and sale of copyright-protected
works. I will start out with some examples of ghostwriting. Ghostwriting
seems a paradigmatic example of the differences between authorship concerns
and standard trademark law. Neither the application of property-based
attribution “rights” nor the application of standard trademark principles seem
to be a very good fit for the protection of social interests in ascertaining
authorship.
A.

Ghostwriting

Ghostwriting is perhaps as old as authorship itself. Of course, this doesn’t
mean it is a good thing. Mahesh Grossman’s recent book, Write a Book
Without Lifting a Finger, states that its target audience is anyone who
“fantasizes about seeing their name on a real published book.”241 (Without
lifting a finger, of course.) In its most aggressive form, where the attributed
author writes nothing and the ghostwriter is completely unacknowledged,
ghostwriting is pure plagiarism.242 In return for literary labor, the ghostwriter
240

WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, Among School Children, reprinted in THE COLLECTED
POEMS OF W.B. YEATS 215 (Richard J. Finneran II ed., 2d ed. MacMillan 1996).
241 MAHESH GROSSMAN, WRITE A BOOK WITHOUT LIFTING A FINGER (2003). Presumably,
Mahesh Grossman wrote the book, but who knows?
242 As stated above, plagiarism is essentially the misattribution of authorship. See supra
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accepts financial compensation as a quid pro quo for a lack of credit.243 For
instance, in the case of Hillary Clinton’s book It Takes A Village, a ghostwriter
was allegedly paid $120,000 to provide literary services and, apparently in
return, the existence of the ghostwriter was not disclosed on the book’s cover
or in the acknowledgements.244 Acknowledgement may be granted to a
ghostwriter, but since the whole premise of ghostwriting seems to be about the
misattribution of authorship, the more credit the ghostwriter gets, the less the
activity appears like ghostwriting and the more it appears like collaboration.
Ghostwriting is popular because it makes abundant market sense for both
parties in the transaction. The fame of a politician, an athlete, a five-star
general, or some other celebrity, can create a public demand for works of
authorship created by that person. However, creative authorship generally
requires substantial time, effort, and some degree of writing skill. Celebrities
may not possess the time or skill, or be willing to invest the effort to produce
quality authorial works.245 On the other hand, many skilled authors possess
time and talent, but lack the popular appeal or fame that might allow them to
sell their works to the public. So obviously, both the employer and the ghost
have something worthwhile to gain from misleading the public as to the
authorship of a literary work.
If one were to take an “authorial rights” approach to attribution and
ghostwriting, it should be clear that the practice would be unproblematic. If a
ghostwriter (“B”) is paid to attribute her novel to the exclusive authorship of a
well-known celebrity (“A”), this act is consensual among A and B. If the
public is deceived by this misattribution of authorship, this is not problematic
from the standpoint of either A or B.246 Even under analogies to trademark
law, this type of “name licensing” seems unexceptional. A is simply licensing
B to produce certain goods bearing the A™ mark.247 In order to say that any
note 66.
243 The Follett case, discussed supra Part II.A.3, gives a standard example of this kind of
negotiation for authorial credit. Follett v. New Am. Library, 497 F. Supp. 304, 313
(S.D.N.Y. 1974)
244 Charles Paul Freund, Living Hillary: The Art of Ghost-Reading, REASON ONLINE,
June 17, 2003, http://reason.com/links/links061703.shtml (criticizing Clinton for her alleged
use of a ghostwriter for the books Living History and It Takes a Village).
245
Tomas
Kellner,
Under
Cover,
FORBES.COM,
July
7,
2003,
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2003/0707/096.html (“Publishers covet celebrities, or even
quasi-celebrities . . . who offer juicy stories and built-in brand recognition. Fame brings big
bucks: Bill Clinton will earn a reported $10 million for his book, Whoopi Goldberg $6
million and Ozzy Osbourne’s clan $3 million. The hitch: ‘Very often these people don’t
have a clue how to read a book, much less to write one,’ says Richard Pine, a New York
book agent.”).
246 See supra note 97 and accompanying text (describing how commercial trademarks do
not represent a single entity but a web of contractual relationships among producers of
goods or services).
247 See id.
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harm is occurring here, we must assert that there is something about an
inaccurate designation of authorship that can be misleading and potentially
damaging to the public.248 In the case of a claim of individual authorship, it is
not difficult to see that this is the case. Where the author is claimed to be a
person, and not an amorphous symbol, attribution posits some meaningful
connection between signifier and signified. If a consistent style of authorship
can be ascertained from a careful scientific analysis of a given work,249 then to
say that a person is an author is to point to a proposition that can be factually
true or false. This proposition is arguably much more significant than any
thing pointed to by a trademark. Thus, misattributions of authorship may create
harms to consumers that are more serious than the harms created by the
misleading use of trademarks.
Yet ghostwriting demonstrates that such deceptions are sometimes
“licensed” by both the true and falsely credited authors. Even celebrated
writers have ghostwriters. It may seem odd to think that those who gain their
fame through the labors of literary art would be inclined to let others write
under their names, but it happens. Tom Clancy, for example, is a worldfamous author of spy thrillers such as The Hunt for Red October, Patriot
Games, and The Cardinal of the Kremlin.250 His success with these books has
been leveraged into a multi-media empire of films, computer games, and
television programs.251 Tom Clancy’s Op-Center: Line of Control is one book
in an Op-Center series currently being sold in stores. The name “Tom Clancy”
appears five times on the front and back cover of the paperback (including in
80-point type on the top of the cover). 252
The Op-Center books, however, were all written by Jeff Rovin.253 Line of
Control’s cover does, in a very small typeface on the bottom of the front cover,
declare it was “written by Jeff Rovin” – although only after it states (in
addition to all the other Clancy marks) that the book was “Created by Tom
Clancy and Steve Pieczenik.” This is likely somewhat confusing to the
average consumer. Line of Control was shelved at my local library, by author,
in the “C” section.254 (Perhaps this misshelving might be explained by the fact

248

See 3 MCCARTHY § 24.03[2], supra note 100, at 24-13 (characterizing the purpose of
trademark law as the prevention of consumer confusion leading to inefficient purchasing).
249 See supra note 8 (describing high-tech tools for determining the identities of authors
and artists).
250 Wikipedia: Tom Clancy, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tom_Clancy (last visited Aug.
12, 2005).
251 Id. (reporting on Clancy’s many novels, ghostwritten novels, films, and videogames).
252 JEFF ROVIN, TOM CLANCY’S OP-CENTER: LINE OF CONTROL (2001) (displaying
Clancy’s name prominently on its cover).
253 Id.
254 I actually spoke briefly with my township librarian about this. She concluded that the
book was technically misshelved. In subsequent visits, I’ve noticed that the book remains
technically misshelved.
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that the first six books in the Op-Center series reportedly did not indicate on
the cover that Rovin was also the author of those books.255)
Tom Clancy did not collaborate in writing the Op-Center books, at least as
most consumers would understand that word. He apparently brainstormed a
bit, in a telephone conversation, the basic concept of a television series upon
which the books are based.256 He then contracted to allow Rovin to write the
Op-Center books under his name.257 Many purchasers, however, were
understandably unaware of the underlying circumstances of the “creation” of
the book by Clancy. Instead, many purchasers seemed to read the Op-Center
series with the mistaken impression that Tom Clancy actually wrote the books.
On Amazon.com, some volunteer reviewers of Tom Clancy’s Op-Center: Line
of Control have praised the book as, e.g., “an excellent thriller by Tom Clancy”
while others have panned the book by stating, e.g., that “Tom Clancy is clearly
overreaching in this incoherent and rambling book set in Kashmir.”258 Other
reviewers express disappointment with the quality of the writing coupled with
a statement that the purchaser mistakenly believed that Tom Clancy had
something to do with the book’s authorship – but the reviewer has since
grasped the truth.259 According to recent news reports, Clancy is complaining
that the Rovin-authored Clancy books are destroying his authorial reputation –
yet he finds himself unable to escape from his contract with Rovin.260 Of

255 See Roger Friedman, Tom Clancy’s Jack Ryan Replaced by Gen-X Version, FOX
NEWS, Aug. 1, 2003, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,93515,00.html (stating that
Rovin’s name did not appear on the first six installments of the Op-Center series).
256 See Arthur Santana, Judge Set to Rule on Clancy Venture, WASH. POST, Sept. 12,
2004, at T3 (reporting that Clancy became interested in the “Op-Center” project as a
planned miniseries).
257 See Friedman, supra note 255.
258 See Amazon.com Reviews of Tom Clancy’s Op-Center: Line of Control,
http://www.amazon.com (search “Line of Control,” then follow “Line of Control” link in
results list) (last viewed Aug. 12, 2005).
259 The pseudonymous reviewer “Big Dog,” from Christchurch, New Zealand, wrote:
I based my purchase on two things. One, I thought Tom Clancy had something to do
with it. And two, the blurb on the back seemed interesting. Well, I was mislead on
both counts. I cannot for the life of me spot any influence from Tom Clancy – there is
truly something wrong in the literary world when the cover of the book has the author
in the smallest letters at the bottom.
Id. Something also might be read into the fact that used copies of Tom Clancy’s Op-Center:
Line of Control were on sale in 2004 on Amazon.com at the price of one penny (plus
shipping). Id.
260 See Nancy Kercheval, Tom Clancy Seeks New Fans amid Turmoil with Ex, THE
DAILY
RECORD,
Aug.
30,
2004,
available
at
http://www.mddailyrecord.net/pub/5_51_monday/businessnews/159181-1.html:
Clancy . . . has branded several series, including the “Op-Center” series of 14 books
and the video game ‘Splinter Cell.’ [T]he books . . . have declined from sales of 1.7
million to just under 600,000, despite commanding advances of $2.25 million for the
next two installments . . . . Clancy’s former wife . . . whom he divorced in 1999 after
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course, this has led to litigation.261
Another world-famous author, Virginia Cleo Andrews, is also having books
produced under her name. V.C. Andrews gained her fame by writing pulp
horror novels involving troubled young girls surviving perverse torments
inflicted by demented adults.262 The appeal of this niche may be elusive to the
adult reader – and publishers didn’t see it at first either. Flowers in the Attic,
Andrews’s first novel, was rejected seven times before it found a publisher in
1977.263 After publication, however, the book became a phenomenon, finding
popularity with (of course) young girls.264 A few years after Flowers in the
Attic was published, V.C. Andrews was an international literary star, securing
million-dollar advances for her novels.265 However, she increasingly felt
trapped in her “troubled children” niche. She made two efforts in the 1980s to
break away from stories of suffering children and demented adults – but her
publisher rejected both.266 Little did she know how long she would be trapped
in the profitable formula. In 2003, one could find copies of the new V.C.
Andrews novel Midnight Flight for sale in bookstores everywhere – another
story of “troubled girls” subject to mistreatment by demented adults.267 The
cover of Midnight Flight states that the book is “[t]he thrilling sequel to Broken
Wings – from New York times bestselling author, V.C. Andrews.” The name
“V.C. Andrews” is emblazoned on the book in 160-point drop-shadow and
relief letters.268
Yet V.C. Andrews did not write Midnight Flight or many other books
attributed to her. She died in 1986.269 After her death (and apparently without
ever having ascertained her preferences in the matter) her publisher was
suddenly struck with the idea of continuing to produce books attributed to the

30 years, challenged his decision to withdraw his name from ‘Tom Clancy’s OpCenter’ series, saying the books would be worthless . . . . Circuit Judge Warren J.
Krug . . . ruled that Clancy’s right to his own name is ambiguous, and therefore,
allowed the lawsuit to proceed.
(on file with author).
261 Id. (noting the judge’s decision to allow the suit to go forward).
262 Estate of V.C. Andrews v. United States, 850 F. Supp. 1279, 1281 (E.D. Va. 1994)
(describing the characteristics of the genre and Andrews’s success with it).
263 Id.
264 Id. (stating that the genre “was particularly appealing to teenagers and young
women”).
265 Id.
266 Id. at 1282.
267 V.C. ANDREWS, MIDNIGHT FLIGHT (Pocket Star 2003).
268
Id.
269 See Estate of V.C. Andrews, 850 F. Supp. at 1281 (giving Andrews’s date of death as
December 19, 1986); David Streitfeld, A Novelist’s Tales from the Crypt: V.C. Andrews
Died in 1986 but Her Horror Books Keep Coming, WASH. POST, May 7, 1993, at A1
(concluding that Andrews has been “more prolific dead than alive”).
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authorship of V.C. Andrews.270 Her agent independently arrived at the same
idea. The estate also agreed that the death of the author shouldn’t be an
impediment to the life of profits.271 Andrew Neiderman, an English teacher in
New York, was recruited to be the undisclosed ghostwriter.272 Neiderman
received $250,000 of the original $1.5 million advance, while the rest went to
the estate.273 While this was obviously not a significant portion of the literary
proceeds, $250,000 was several times greater than any previous advance
Neiderman had received for his own works of horror fiction published under
his own name.274 Luckily for everyone (except, perhaps, V.C. Andrews), the
Neiderman books continued to sell.275 Subsequently, an IRS auditor learned of
the immense profits that the Andrews estate was reaping from the continued
exploitation of the V.C. Andrews name, and assessed the estate $649,201.77 in
unpaid estate tax and interest on the $1,244,910.80 post-mortem value of the
use of Andrews’s name in conjunction with the misattributed novels.276 This
led to a courtroom battle and a judicial order slightly reducing the IRS
assessment, in part due to the financial risks inherent in attempting to deceive
the public into believing that a dead author was still writing books.277 Today,
270

Jack Romanos, head of Simon & Schuster’s mass market division, conceived the idea.
He explains that after Andrews’s death, “[w]e were sitting around and it occurred to me that
it was possible if we could find a writer . . . who could mimic Virginia’s style, that we might
be able to continue to publish.” Streitfeld, supra note 269, at A1. Andrews’s literary agent
had the same idea: “she never was a celebrity in this country, which made it easier for
people to forget she was dead. It would be very difficult to do this with Danielle Steele.”
Id.
271 See id. (noting that the estate has “profited handsomely” from the posthumous books).
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Id. (stating that Neiderman “had written some horror novels himself, although much
less successfully than Andrews”).
275 But this doesn’t mean that the customers are happy. Many volunteer reviewers on
Amazon.com – even those who give Midnight Flight positive ratings – implore either the
ghost-writer or the family to stop using the V.C. Andrew’s name. For instance, “Stephanie”
from Washington, D.C. liked the book, but writes:
why can’t he stop putting VCA as the author? It would make more sense now as I have
more [ghostwritten] books on my shelf than [Andrews’s books] because she wrote so
few on her own. Use your own name[, ghostwriter]. It will be okay, and maybe better
cause we can stop holding you up to VCA (The Queen).
The interestingly named “Gertrude Snuffenheimer” from Atlanta, on the other hand, writes:
“[t]his is shameful. Poor V.C., rolling around in her grave as I write this. Why does the
[ghostwriter] insist on driving her good name through the mud? I never even finished
Broken Wings, and this one just tops off the true V.C. genius abuse.” See Amazon.com
Reviews of Midnight Flight, http://www.amazon.com (search “Midnight Flight,” follow
“Midnight Flight” link, then follow “See all customer reviews” link) (last visited Aug. 12,
2005).
276 Estate of V.C. Andrews v. United States, 850 F. Supp. 1279, 1281 (E.D. Va. 1994).
277 Id. at 1295 (reducing the tax assessment of the value of Andrews’s name by thirty-
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even after a Washington Post newspaper article, the misattribution of V.C.
Andrews novels continues.278
Given the public’s awareness of the ghostwriting in the cases of Clancy and
Andrews, and the apparent nonchalance and lack of embarrassment of the
parties engaged in the practice, one may well wonder how deep the rabbit-hole
of ghostwriting goes in the publishing industry. Because the uses of Tom
Clancy’s and V.C. Andrews’s names in the sale of books comport fairly well
with theories of rights of publicity and even standard approaches to
trademarks, there seems little reason to suspect that there are substantial checks
being placed on ghostwriting practices.
But if we take a social perspective on the value of authorial attributions,
none of this should sit well. Authorial “licensing” is made valuable by a form
of consumer deception that is inimical to the traditional consumer protection
rationale of trademark.279 Misattribution of authorial identity is valuable to
those who engage in it precisely because it deceives the public.280 Even from
the perspective of an incentives theory, it isn’t at all clear that ghostwriting
provides any public benefits. Has the sale of books by Clancy™ (Rovin) or
V.C. Andrews™ (Neiderman) been beneficial to the public? It seems clear
that traditional trademark law does not map neatly onto authorship in some
instances. In order to protect the public interest, one would need to be much
more restrictive in granting personal name “owners” the freedom to “license”
their authorial attributions. This aligns with Professor McCarthy’s observation
that the law must “insur[e] that the assignee’s use of the mark will not be
deceptive, and will not break the continuity of the thing symbolized by the

three percent to account for the risk involved).
278 At some point, a tiny disclaimer was added to the copyright page of the book stating
that Andrews is dead. V.C. ANDREWS, MIDNIGHT FLIGHT (2003). However, as in the Clancy
example, this gesture at informational veracity is small, ambiguous, and hard to reconcile
with the bold authorial attribution on the covers of the books, which everyone seems to
admit is what drives the sale of the books. The Simon & Schuster web page for V.C.
Andrews seems to fully recognize that readers are interested in the identity of the author. It
contains many photos of Andrews, a brief biography of her early life, and a list of her
current paperbacks for sale. However, it has no pictures of Andrew Neiderman; it fails to
distinguish between the Neiderman and Andrews books; and it does not mention that V.C.
Andrews died some years ago.
See Simon Says: V.C. Andrews,
http://www.simonsays.com/content/content.cfm?sid=33&pid=330975 (last viewed Aug. 12,
2005) (follow “Image Gallery” link).
279 For some thoughts along these lines, see Green, supra note 25, at 190 (“[T]he
author’s consent should not be a defense to plagiarism.”); Pinover, supra note 40, at 41
(observing that ghostwriting, which is essentially authorized reversed passing off, “does not
cure the deception of the consuming public”).
280 See Estate of V.C. Andrews, 850 F. Supp. at 1284-85 (explaining that measures were
taken to “maintain the illusion” that the ghostwritten books were Andrews’ work, because
“Andrews’ name was central to the promotional effort”).
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assigned mark.”281 If authorial attribution interests are to be protected under
trademark-type theories, they must be protected in a way that is unlike
traditional trademark protections. Attribution must be bounded to some factual
and socially valuable truth about the identity of the true author. In other
words, in the case of authorial attribution, trademark law should ensure the
reliability of consumer beliefs about the connection between claims of
authorship and the true process of the work’s creation. Consumer beliefs can
vary according to the type of work at issue, as will be discussed in the next
section.
B.

Collaborative Authorship and Social Value

In ghostwriting, where the attributed author writes nothing and the existence
of the ghostwriter is undisclosed, we clearly are faced with certain problems as
set forth above. However, in some instances of ghostwriting, an attributed
author will make some contribution to a literary production. Also, a
ghostwriter occasionally obtains some acknowledgement for contributions.
Collaborations between celebrities and skilled authors are sometimes truthfully
marketed as such. Thus, the situation of ghostwriting simply marks one
extreme position within a much broader spectrum of comparative attribution
issues in cases where collaborators produce creative works. In instances of
collaboration, the same dynamics that fuel ghostwriting will often lead to
marketing strategies that promote to the public the reputation of the prominent
author – even where the parties contribute equally. An example might be
taken from the recent literary output of the Supreme Court. In the year before
the decision in Dastar, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor published a book about
her early childhood: Lazy B: Growing Up on a Cattle Ranch in the American
Southwest.282 She collaborated on the book with H. Alan Day, her brother.
Day is a lifelong cattle rancher (and writer) who ran the Lazy B ranch for thirty
years.283 According to USA Today, Day provided O’Connor with the
“material” for the book, which O’Connor then revised and reorganized.284
Just as Doubleday knew that Eisenhower’s authorship could sell copies of

281 3 MCCARTHY § 18:2, supra note 100, at 18-8 to 18-9; Fair Undercar Care, Inc. v.
Wakefield, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10120, at *16 (N.D. Ill. July 2, 1992) (citing
MCCARTHY).
282 SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR & ALAN DAY, LAZY B: GROWING UP ON A CATTLE RANCH IN
THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST (hardcover ed., Random House 2002).
283 Deirdre Donahue, Even Cowgirls Get to the High Court, USA TODAY, Jan. 21, 2002,
at 1D (reporting that Day “remained on the ranch, managing it for 30 years after graduating
from the University of Arizona”).
284 According to USA Today, “[b]oth siblings agree that Day possesses more
‘institutional memories.’ He would write material for the book, then his sister would revise
and reorganize his original drafts. They also would meet, correspond and compare their
memories. O’Connor eliminated Day’s chapter, ‘My Sister Sandra.’” Donahue, supra note
283.
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Crusade in Europe, publisher Random House surely knew that Justice
O’Connor’s authorship could sell copies of Lazy B. Indeed, just as Crusade in
Europe was marketed as being Eisenhower writing about his memories of
World War II, Lazy B was marketed as Justice O’Connor writing about her
memories of childhood. O’Connor’s authorial designation appears on the
cover at roughly twice the size of her brother’s (four times as large on the
paperback), O’Connor’s picture appears on the cover,285 O’Connor reads aloud
the audiobook version, and – perhaps most importantly – the book is written
using the first person voice of Justice O’Connor.286 Even chapters that deal
primarily with Alan Day and his private thoughts are also written in the voice
of O’Connor.287 Given the collaborative nature of the book’s production and
its topic, there was obviously some inherent potential for consumer confusion
as to the authorship of Lazy B. Some readers undoubtedly bought the book to
gain a glimpse into the thinking of one of the most influential Supreme Court
Justices of the last century. Instead, they found a great many details about
cattle ranching. This is not to say that there was anything misleading about the
book. But it does point out how the marketing of collaborative authorship is
influenced by the gravitational pull of one author’s celebrity. The mechanics
of production may be influenced by other factors. Even where collaboration is
fully disclosed, when consumers misestimate the type and degree of
collaboration that can be expected, they may be disappointed.288
Yet many, perhaps most, entertainment products for sale today are produced
by similar processes of collaborative authorship.289 In the case of film, for
285

O’CONNOR & DAY, supra note 282; SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR & ALAN DAY, LAZY B:
GROWING UP ON A CATTLE RANCH IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST (paperback ed., Random
House 2003).
286 See O’CONNOR & DAY, supra note 282, at 6 (narrating in the first person).
287 Id. at 213-225. For example, Chapter 20 is primarily about Day and his horse, Saber,
and seems a strange fit with the first person voice of Justice O’Connor. The use of
O’Connor’s point of view requires Day’s thoughts to be rendered in the third person. See,
e.g., id. at 224:
Alan picked up a big half-Brahma cow that looked pretty athletic and decided to turn
Saber loose on her. Alan had always held him back a little and had never really let him
loose on a cow to run her and turn her back because he was so powerful and so fast.
Alan always wanted to throttle him back a little. This time, just for fun, Alan turned
the old cow up the fence. . . . He let the reins go slack and thought, “Well, let’s see
what happens here.”
The excised “My Sister Sandra” chapter obviously would have been even more difficult to
reconcile with O’Connor’s first person voice. See supra note 284.
288 There has been an interesting recent trend, in a similar family vein, of collaborations
among parental authors and their children. In some cases, the children continue to write in
the same literary genre of the parent. The family name “brand” of the parent is recognized
by the public, the intellectual property licenses are probably not so hard to negotiate, and
some degree of familiarity with the material might be reasonably presumed on the part of
the child. Of course, one wonders if authorial expertise and talent are hereditary.
289 See Hunter & Lastowka, supra note 26, at 979 (observing that many creative works
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instance, there are often hundreds of authors. The film Saving Private Ryan
was marketed as a “Steven Spielberg film,” yet it involved the creative
contributions of over 700 individuals.290 The list of authors whose
contributions created stylistic “fingerprints” on Saving Private Ryan is
obviously extremely long. It is so long that it would clearly be beyond the
interest, as well as beyond the ability, of the average consumer to remember
the names of these individuals and to understand what each individual
contributed to the film. It is unlikely that director Steven Spielberg knows who
deserves personal credit for each aspect of the film. The Dastar Court was
correct to recognize that consumers may not be interested in all information
regarding authorship of collaborative creations.291
So how does this modify the conclusions in the previous section?
Obviously, in cases involving more than two or three authors who contribute to
a single work, consumer interests in ascertaining the details of a work’s
authorship can become much more diffused.292 In the case of written works, if
the public purchases a book it believes to be authored by Tom Clancy or V.C.
Andrews, we can say that the public has been deceived if Tom Clancy or V.C.
Andrews did not, in fact, make a substantial authorial contribution to the
authorship of the purchased book. If the public purchases a “Steven Spielberg”
movie, however, the public will not be deceived if it finds out that Spielberg
did not personally write the script, create the costumes, compose the music,
and act all the parts.293 The public is aware that Spielberg instead supervised,
partially controlled and had some auteur influence over various aspects of the
movie.
Steven Spielberg’s directorial role in Saving Private Ryan is clearly relevant
to consumers. The fact that Spielberg could manage to get his name put on the
film seems to validate the point that his authorial attribution provides some

are now produced by committee).
290 See Saving Private Ryan: Full Cast and Crew, The Internet Movie Database,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0120815/fullcredits (last visited Sept. 17, 2005).
291 An unidentified Justice stated during oral argument in the Dastar case that film
credits are generally something that “no one ever reads.” Transcript of Oral Argument at
51, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) (No. 02-428) (“I
mean, the screen credits, you know, you’re going to the refrigerator or reading cert petitions
or something.”); cf. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 35-36 (“We do not think the Lanham Act requires
this search for the source of the Nile and all its tributaries.”).
292 This isn’t to say that crediting in instances of large-scale collaboration is not of
interest to some segment of the public. Within creative industries, credits can be extremely
important. Indeed, it was the presumed importance of film credits to actors and the film
industry that led the Ninth Circuit to adopt the “bodily appropriation” doctrine. See Cleary
v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 1994).
293 Nor does copyright law grant much weight to screen credits. See Dougherty, supra
note 217, at 313 (“A person is not an author under U.S. law simply because he is called the
director or is credited as the director on screen. The fundamental question under U.S. law
is: Who originated a particular expression?”).
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value. Again, Post-it™ Notes could be, but aren’t, distributed with similar
attributions.294 Primary marketing attribution is often used as an additional
form of incentive and compensation. Key parties in the film process will often
wrangle and even litigate over their right to be promoted as the creative force
behind a project.295 The end result of this process (which is additionally
regulated in minute detail by the various guilds and collective bargaining
agreements) is a particular presentation and marketing of a film’s “authorship”
to the public. This marketing usually promotes a very small subset of actual
authors – perhaps a director, a lead actor, and/or another significant
contributor, such as the author of a book that is being adapted.296 In the case of
Saving Private Ryan, Steven Spielberg, Tom Hanks, and Matt Damon were the
primary brands under which the film was marketed.297
For the public, this kind of personal “branding” of collaborative efforts,
while it may not explain much about the details of the complicated process of
authorship, can still provide important information in much the same way that
a traditional trademark provides some useful information. As stated above, the
word “Nike” on a sneaker generally means very little to a consumer in terms of
actual information. Likewise, the fact that a certain person has been associated
with a certain project may say very little about any personal involvement with
the work’s creation. But if that person has previously appeared in association
with high quality creative works, this can be taken by the public as some
indication that the new film’s quality and characteristics will be the same as
those previously associated with that actor or director.298 Society certainly

294

Similarly, the end credits of a motion picture, even the most obscure ones, are not
simply superfluous nonsense. They are surely relevant as a personal motivator to those
engaged in film production, and may also be useful within the movie industry. Those
professionals who understand the making of films may have an interest in knowing the
identities of individuals behind creative contributions, and credits can help individuals
secure work on later projects. MELVIN SIMENSKY ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW 1005-1120
(3d ed. 2003). This is not to suggest, however, that these long lists of film credits provide
much of value to the average consumer.
295 See generally Gulick, supra note 113 (discussing attribution practices and
negotiations in film crediting); see also SIMENSKY ET AL., supra note 294, at 1005-20
(discussing contractual disputes over credit obligations); Gulick, supra note 113 at 87 (“For
directors such as Warren Beatty and Woody Allen, the granting of the [final cut] right is in
the interests of the producers, who view it as a simple exchange for access to the proven
economic success of the director’s name and reputation.”).
296 One can get a sense of how marketing concerns, financial power, and artistic ego
collide by looking at any group of movie posters and comparing the size and placement of
the names of actors, producers, directors, and (in some cases) the novelists, playwrights, or
other persons that provided the inspiration for the film.
297 And, in turn, the film’s success further promoted the strength of these brands.
298 Gulick, supra note 113, at 100:
When a consumer thinks of the author of a film, he thinks of its artistic, not legal,
author. . . . For consumers, the attribution of a film’s source to its director functions
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recognizes the brand value of the participation of Julia Roberts or George
Clooney with a film project. The public knows that these names and
reputations are placed on the line by association with the project – if the
project fails, the branded celebrity will suffer a loss of public reputation. Thus,
practices of authorial attribution where certain personalities reap credit for the
efforts of large collaborative teams operate in much the same way that
trademark identifiers establish consumer associations with the collaborative
production of business, corporate, and contractually licensed entities.299 In the
case of large-scale collaboration, the basis for trademark protection becomes
much more analogous to the traditional reputation and endorsement
dynamics.300
However, the difference between authorship and trademark in the case of
collaborative enterprises also suggests that a deviation from normal trademark
doctrine is warranted. Claims of reverse passing off are hard to justify where
the choice of any particular personal association with a work of collective
authorship is largely arbitrary. Because traditional trademarks designate
collective enterprises, reverse passing off arguably promotes greater truth in
communication in an economical fashion. In the case of large-scale projects,
such as films, none of the myriad of authors clearly deserves to be one of the
subset of persons who have their authorial identities explicitly advertised and
promoted in association with the work. It would seem impossible to allow, for
instance, each of several hundred contributors to a film to claim that a work
was being “passed off” where they were not attributed with authorship in
conjunction with the sale of the work. Additionally, as the Dastar court noted,
the corporate publisher (the copyright “author”) of a film and the manufacturer
of the film’s tangible medium are largely irrelevant to consumers – thus
reverse passing off, as applied to those entities, will serve no socially useful
purpose.301 In the case of collaborative authorship, it seems the justification
for the doctrine of reverse passing off falls away. The Dastar case reaches the
right results, but for the wrong reasons.
The difference between collaborative and individual authorship with regard
to reverse passing off is significant. The attribution of authorship, or the
like a brand-name identifier. . . . There is a certain value to consumers to the extent
that they form these associations, for they save on search and information costs.
299
See Hughes, supra note 18 (discussing how common trademarks such as Sara Lee
represent collaborations between several corporate entities).
300 Indeed, some popular “authors” are artificial constructs. For instance, bands like
Alvin and the Chipmunks and the contemporary band Gorillaz feature animated cartoons as
musicians, essentially attributing musical talent to fictional authors that are collaboratively
produced. See Gorillaz, http://www.gorillaz.com/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2005) (official
website). For a high-tech take on the animated celebrity, see the recent film Simone (New
Line Cinema 2002).
301 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 32 (2003) (“The
purchaser of a novel is interested not merely, if at all, in the identity of the producer of the
physical tome . . . .”).
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failure to attribute authorship, in the case of a singular author (or a small set of
authors) carries with it some degree of socially important empirical truth.
Thus, ghostwriting should be actionable as a form of reverse passing off. By
contrast, large-scale collaborative efforts disassociate the authorship mark from
any factually meaningful information about the product.
C.

The Limits of Attribution Protection

Finally, I would like to suggest that any application of trademark law to
works of authorship must be limited to marks that meet three criteria: 1) they
should be prominently placed (or deserve to be placed) on the exterior of the
work; 2) they should be placed (or deserve to be placed) there with the hope of
establishing goodwill and driving sales of the product; and 3) they should serve
to designate creative authorship to readers who would care about this
authorship. None of these requirements is particularly unusual under
traditional notions of trademark law. Trademark law has traditionally focused
on extrinsic marks placed on the exteriors of products,302 and has sought to
protect consumers against confusion as to the source of products where such
confusion will lead to ill-informed purchases.303
Yet in the current climate of trademark regulation, authorship protections
could clearly extend beyond this point. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit case of Smith
v. Montoro,304 relied upon by the lower courts in the Dastar case and overruled
by Dastar, was essentially an attempt to regulate the crediting of component
parts of a work under a theory of trademark.305 Smith, and courts that relied
upon it, suggested that credit sequences of films were an appropriate concern
of trademark law.306 If one approaches trademark regulation from the
standpoint of anti-plagiarism norms, moral rights arguments, or analogies to
rights of publicity, one might argue that the result in Smith v. Montoro is
justified. The criteria above, however, would not extend so far. I would
suggest that if we regulate authorship designations pursuant to trademark law,
we should do it in a way that comports with a very conservative approach to
the goals of trademark regulation.
I make this qualification somewhat reluctantly. There are arguments to be
made for broader protections. Consumer deception can certainly occur with
regard to the authorship of component pieces of creative work. Our social
norms against plagiarism do not just condemn the misattribution of entire
works of authorship where those misattributions are made on the exterior
surfaces of works sold in commerce. Instead, anti-plagiarism norms extend to
302

Rogers, supra note 73 (characterizing the origins of trademark law in the regulation of
guild emblems on goods).
303 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34 (describing the purpose of trademark law).
304 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981).
305 Id. at 605 (finding that trademark law properly applied to the substitution of one
actor’s name for another in a film’s credits and advertising).
306 See id.
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condemn much more fine-grained instances of misattribution, where authors
borrow phrases or ideas without attribution. Plagiarism concerns itself with
appropriate credit for the multiple bits and pieces of a work.307 However, none
of the recent plagiarism scandals mentioned in the introduction would run
afoul of my proposed standard. Why not extend the standard further? To
extend regulation of attribution as finely as plagiarism would reach would
likely prove overly burdensome for authors, readers, and the court system. The
burden of writing, reading, and regulating extensive footnotes and credit lists
for every creative text sold to the public is not an obligation one would want to
impose on the entertainment business or the purchasing public. Creativity
itself is often merely a practice of finding bits and pieces of the works of others
and assembling them into a new unified whole.308 Because all words and
symbols must refer to prior words and symbols simply in order to be
intelligible, all new works must borrow from prior works to some degree.309
To insert law into this process by regulating authorial attribution for the bits
and pieces of authorship contained inside texts would almost certainly lead to
the disclosure of more information than any consumer would care to know.
1.

Extrinsic and Intrinsic Crediting: Vocal Dubbing

To show the effect of a conservative approach in practice, we might take, for
example, the practice of vocal dubbing. In vocal dubbing, one person’s voice
is directly blended with the image of another person’s vocalizing. One can see
that vocal dubbing might easily raise concerns very similar to those raised by
ghostwriting. If Tom Clancy, for instance, is credited (and shown on music
videos) as the vocalist on an album of great Broadway show tunes, some of his
admiring public may be inclined to purchase the album. If Jeff Rovin were
actually singing the songs, however, this would be a deceptive designation of
authorship.310 Where the item for sale is a musical work, and the authorship of
the vocal performance is clearly a primary concern of the purchaser, this type

307

See generally PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A
POSTMODERN WORLD (Lise Buranen & Alice M. Roy eds., 1999); Malcolm Gladwell,
Something Borrowed, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 22, 2004, at 40 (describing how a
psychiatrist tracked “thematic similarities” between her book and a play she alleged was
plagiarized from it).
308 There are many other words for this process, e.g., collage, collection, arrangement,
found art, etc. For some thoughts on the importance of this process to art and its limits, see
generally Gladwell, supra note 307 (discussing the work of playwright Bryony Lavery and
her use of sources in the Broadway play Frozen).
309 See, e.g., Note, Originality, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1988, 1990 (2002) (asserting that “all
writing is, in some sense, rewriting”).
310 Ventriloquism and puppetry are essentially ancient technologies of dubbing. These
uses do not strike most adults as deceptive, however, because they must take place within
the realm of suspended disbelief. (We all know puppets can’t talk.) Animation today is
another popular and unproblematic use of dubbing.
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of deception should be actionable under trademark law. My proposed line,
however, would separate this hypothetical situation from more common
instances of vocal dubbing. Vocal dubbing in a film, for instance, would likely
not be actionable. As stated above, the consumer concerns over particular
component pieces of authorship within a work are more diffuse.
Is there a public interest in preventing vocal dubbing in collaborative
efforts? Consider the classic Hollywood film Singin’ in the Rain.311 The film
is set during the revolutionary point in film history when the industry was
being transformed from the era of silent film to the era of contemporary
“talkies.” In the movie, Gene Kelly plays the part of Don Lockwood, a former
vaudevillian and stuntman turned celebrity actor.312 When a major film project
fails due to his co-star’s poor vocal talents, Lockwood proposes that his love
interest, the aspiring actress Kathy Selden (played by Debbie Reynolds) should
provide the on-screen singing voice of the acoustically challenged Lina
Lamont (played by Jean Hagen). Both Lockwood and Selden are aware that
this practice will mislead the public as to Lamont’s singing talents, and also
won’t do much to promote Selden’s career. Yet Selden agrees to the
arrangement in order to save Lockwood’s career from ruin. What seems a
perfect idea at first leads to predictable comedic complications: Lamont
demands that Selden be required to dub her singing vocals permanently and
threatens the head of the studio if he does not comply with her demands.313 At
the film’s premiere, Lockwood and the owner of the film studio create a ruse to
reveal the dubbing. They demand that Selden must sing for Lamont, live,
behind a curtain while Lamont lip-synchs. Selden grows indignant, but
complies. In the film’s climax, Lockwood and the studio head literally raise
the curtain on the undisclosed Selden/Lamont collaboration. This public
disclosure of Selden’s vocal dubbing for Lamont both humiliates Lamont and
catapults Selden into Hollywood stardom.314
The moral of the film seems clear – Lamont’s claiming credit for the work
of Selden was deceptive. The film suggests that the public will hold the
Lamonts of the world in contempt and will support the Seldens, the true and

311

SINGIN’ IN THE RAIN (Metro-Goldwyn Mayer 1952). Perhaps the film is such a classic
in Hollywood because it is all about Hollywood. It provides parodies of real personalities in
the movie industry – language coaches, egomaniacal studio heads, aspiring starlets who
profess to be concerned about high art, and venomous divas threatening to bankrupt studios.
312 See Singin’ in the Rain: Full Cast and Crew, The Internet Movie Database,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0045152/fullcredits (last visited Aug. 12, 2005).
313 Lamont explicitly evokes her legal and contractual rights:
I had my lawyer go over my contract. . . . The studio’s responsible for every word printed
about me. If I don’t like it, I can sue, I can sue. If you tell the papers about Kathy
Selden, it would be detrimental and deleterious to my career. I could sue you for the
whole studio.
SINGIN’ IN THE RAIN (Metro-Goldwyn Mayer 1952).
314 Id.
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talented vocal authors. During the late 1980s, the pop music duo Milli Vanilli
found themselves re-enacting this morality play. Charles Shaw, John Davis,
and Brad Howe played the part of Selden.315 The trio had vocal talent, but they
were getting older and had been deemed (by their manager) unmarketable to
the MTV generation. So their manager hired aspiring dancer/models Rob
Pilatus and Fabrice Morvan to be Lamonts, lip-synching the trio’s songs. The
arrangement worked fantastically – everyone thought Pilatus and Morvan were
actually singing the songs. In 1990, Milli Vanilli won a coveted Grammy
Award for Best New Artist (beating out the Indigo Girls and rapper ToneLoc).316 Pilatus and Morvan were overnight celebrities. They pressed their
manager to let them sing on their next album. The band’s manager, apparently
overwhelmed by orchestrating the deception and dealing with competing
demands (much like the studio owner in Singin’ in the Rain), raised the curtain
on the lip-synching.317 The public was appropriately shocked, the Grammy
Award was revoked, and the band became a scapegoat for all that was
inauthentic about popular music.318 And yes, a lawsuit was filed on behalf of a
wronged public.319 Like Lamont before them, Pilatus and Morvan were
disgraced.320 (Unfortunately, the public of the MTV era did not catapult Shaw,
315

Wikipedia: Milli Vanilli, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milli_Vanilli (last visited Aug.
12, 2005).
316 Id. (describing Milli Vanilli as the only group ever to have a Grammy Award
revoked).
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 A lawsuit was initiated based upon the claim that the public had been fraudulently
deceived into purchasing Milli Vanilli albums by the misrepresentation that Morvan and
Pilatus actually sang the vocals. See Freedman v. Arista Records, Inc., 137 F.R.D. 225
(E.D. Pa. 1991); Cross, supra note 20, at 709 & n.1.
320 Of course, Milli Vanilli was not the first band to be accused of inauthenticity. The
1960’s pop band The Monkees, for instance, is commonly criticized for being deceptively
inauthentic. The group was the brainchild of two entertainment executives, Bob Rafelson
and Bert Schneider, who created the band as a way to use television to cash in on the
Beatles phenomenon. They recruited the band members (two actors and two musicians)
from auditions involving hundreds of aspirants. Stephen Stills of Crosby Stills & Nash
actually auditioned. A separate creative team wrote the Monkees’ early songs and studio
musicians were employed to play the musical instruments on the song tracks. At one point,
it was even planned that the Monkees would simply lipsynch all their songs exactly as Milli
Vanilli did, so that the band members would contribute nothing but their images and acting.
Ultimately, however, some members of the band were allowed to add vocal tracks to the
songs. While the band members were originally hired for $450 a week and less than 2
percent of the record royalties, they followed the normal path of leveraging their acquired
fame to push for greater creative control. Those efforts were partially successful – records
and singles by the Monkees at times topped sales of the Beatles – but greater creative control
also heralded the band’s decline. The group’s chemistry, its public image, and its fame were
largely attributable to the success of the syndicated television show and the “authorship” of
the two creative managers. The individual members had to struggle – largely unsuccessfully
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Davis, and Howe to stardom.) After a long downward career spiral – including
a stint in prison – Rob Pilatus died of a drug overdose in Germany in 1998.321
The moral conclusions of both Singin’ in the Rain and the Milli Vanilli affair
might seem congruent. However, looking past the fiction of Singin’ in the
Rain, the making of the movie tells a completely different story. Kathy Selden
actually had her own Kathy Seldens: Betty Noyes sang many of Debbie
Reynolds’s songs in the film and Gene Kelly actually dubbed some of
Reynolds’s tap dancing.322 In the most interesting reversal – Jean Hagan (who
played Lamont) dubbed Reynolds’s speech in the scenes where Selden was
dubbing the voice of Lamont.323 Even in 1952, in a film marketed to the public
as a story about the triumph of artistic authenticity, the makers of the film had
very little interest in authenticity.324 Hollywood filmmakers still dub vocal
performances just as readily as they use stunt and body doubles to attribute
greater prowess and beauty to the celebrities.325 Marni Nixon is probably the
most famous Kathy Selden figure in Hollywood.326 She dubbed Deborah Kerr
in the film version of The King and I, sang for Natalie Wood in West Side
Story, and was Audrey Hepburn’s voice in My Fair Lady.327 Of course, few
people know of her existence, and some undoubtedly think that Kerr, Wood,
and Hepburn have remarkable singing voices.
My proposal would make the Milli Vanilli facts amenable to legal
regulation, since the attributions of authorship to Pilatus and Morvan were
used to promote and sell the work and were factually deceptive as to
authorship.328 The misattributions that are inherent in the public’s reading of

– to become something like the musical group that they played on television. For extended
versions of this story, see ERIC LEFCOWITZ, THE MONKEES’ TALE (2d ed. 1989); MICKEY
DOLENZ & MARK BEGO, I’M A BELIEVER: MY LIFE OF MONKEES, MUSIC, AND MADNESS
(2004). If you actually want to follow up on this footnote, I would recommend the
Lefcowitz book. It’s much easier to read.
321 See VH1: Milli Vanilli, http://www.vh1.com/artists/az/milli_vanilli/bio.jhtml (last
visited Aug. 12, 2005).
322 Steven Cohan, Case Study: Interpreting Singin’ in the Rain, in REINVENTING FILM
STUDIES 59 (Christine Gledhill & Linda Williams eds., 2000).
323 Id.
324 Perhaps this is why Hollywood loves Singin’ in the Rain so much – there’s plenty of
irony if you know the inside story.
325 In the film, Don Lockwood breaks into the film industry by performing as another
actor’s stunt double.
326 DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, LE TON BEAU DE MAROT: IN PRAISE OF THE MUSIC OF
LANGUAGE 62 (1998) (recounting Nixon’s career as a “ghost” singer for several famous
actresses).
327 Id.; see also Wikipedia: Marni Nixon, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marni_Nixon (last
visited Sept. 15, 2005).
328 An interesting twist on the Milli Vanilli affair occurred recently. A 1980s-era band of
aging punk rockers, The Alarm, drafted members of a much younger band to appear on
screen, while the music of The Alarm was dubbed on top of the visuals. Apparently, this
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Singin’ in the Rain, however, should not be actionable because they are not
made extrinsic to the work. Obviously, this is somewhat problematic. The
dubbing in Singin’ in the Rain creates the potential for public deception with
regard to the singing talents of actors. The visually presented actor who is
dubbed (i.e., Debbie Reynolds) almost certainly garnered a public reputational
value that should have been properly attributed to an undisclosed collaborator
(i.e., Betty Noyes). And just as in ghostwriting, this worked well from a
marketing perspective – both Noyes and Reynolds benefited.
But the vocal dubbing deception in Singin’ in the Rain isn’t linked to the
sale of the work or severable from the work. Perhaps more importantly, there
would have been no way to correct the deception within the context of
collaboratively produced work without disrupting the integrity of the movie. It
would also seem unwise, and perhaps impossible, to attempt to “fix” the public
confusion as to authorship in Singin’ in the Rain without destroying the film
or, in any event, providing the public with far more information than it would
want or need in order to make purchasing decisions. And if we “fix” the
misattribution in Singin’ in the Rain, why stop there? We could require
disclaimers for all potentially deceptive practices in film, e.g., special effects,
body doubles, stuntmen, and digital editing. But accepting that the
entertainment industry is premised on the creation and sale of illusions, there
are sound reasons to be conservative in attempting to root out instances of
consumer deception.
2.

The Inherent Deceptions of Art

This last point – that the marketing of illusion is inherently deceptive – is
worth a few additional comments. The goal of trademark law, in a very broad
sense, is to promote truth in market communications. Yet art, as Picasso noted,
is a lie.329 Obviously there is some potential here for conflict. To illustrate the
kind of misattribution that is inherent in the artistic form, we might look to
Edmond Rostand’s Cyrano de Bergerac. The play is essentially a story of
authorial misattribution.330 The interesting tension latent in the play is that the
approach worked and the song gained a considerable amount of airplay. The band then
raised the curtain on itself and explained that it had engaged in the duplicity because: “We
wanted to make sure we are judged purely on the strength of the music, and not by our old
hairstyles.”
See
BBC
Wales:
The
Alarm,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/wales/music/profiles/pages/alarm.shtml (last visited Aug. 12, 2005)
(describing The Alarm as one of the most internationally successful rock bands to come out
of Wales).
329 A lie that tells the truth, but a lie nonetheless.
330 EDMOND ROSTAND, CYRANO DE BERGERAC (Brian Hooker trans., Bantam Classics
1950). In brief summary, Cyrano, who has a rather large and aesthetically unappealing
proboscis, writes words for another suitor, Christian, to deliver to the lovely Roxane, who is
also the object of Cyrano’s affections. At the end of the play, after the passage of many
years, the misattribution of Cyrano’s words to Christian’s authorship is revealed, and
Roxane declares her love for Cyrano, the author. Cyrano dies of injuries moments later.
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artifice of authorial misattribution that is condemned in the play is, in fact,
integral to the dramatic form of the play itself. When watching the play, we
suspend our disbelief in the identity of the actor and attribute the words of
Rostand to the authority of the actor who plays Cyrano. Within and without
the context of the performance, we are told that authorial misattribution runs
the risk of fraud. Yet within the play, misattribution is inherent in the
collaboration between playwright and actor in creating the fictional world.
Given our tendency to confuse the image with reality and the dancer with
the dance, policing the line between fraud and entertainment can become
problematic. Can we cleanly separate our beliefs about popular actors, for
instance, from the roles that they play? When we see films, we suspend our
disbelief of not only the spontaneity of the actor’s performance, but also of the
entire artifice of the play’s constructed world. To some extent, after the film is
over, we can mentally sever the identity of the actor from the special effects,
the effects of editing, the contribution of collaborators, and all the other
material we see on the screen. To some extent, though, we cannot. Arnold
Schwarzenegger’s recent success in the California gubernatorial election
suggests the extent to which Hollywood can construct identity.
Schwarzenegger’s popular appeal was surely based, in substantial part, on his
association with stern, indestructible cyborgs, barbarians, and maverick action
heroes.331 To some extent this was deceptive. His performances were the
result of scripted fictions, and scripted fictions are inherently deceptive in at
least two ways. First, the identity of the actor is merged with the identity of
the fictional character. Second, the performer often reaps credit for the work
of numerous other collaborative players: writers, composers, choreographers,
and other contributors who are not obvious to those viewing the performance.
However, there are limits to what we can do with attempts to bring laws
requiring truthful communication to the commercial enterprise of art. I would
suggest that while the regulation of extrinsic authorial designations that are
relevant to consumers will not generally intrude on art’s deceptive nature,
attempts to move past that point would be going too far. If we attempt to move
beyond the truth of extrinsic designations and regulate the ways in which art
intrinsically deceives and confuses the public, we run the risk of curtailing the
illusions and deceptions that are inherent in art.
CONCLUSION
This article has suggested that there are good reasons to reverse the holding
of Dastar through legislation and to reintroduce the role of trademark law into
the regulation of designations of authorship, at least to some conservative
extent. When we do this, however, we are also making a decision about the

331 See Actor Biography: Arnold Schwarzenegger, The Internet Movie Database,
http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000216 (last visited Aug. 12, 2005).
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type of authorship that society obtains from the intellectual property system.332
The decision between trademark law and proprietary-based schemes is also a
question of cultural aesthetics. As noted before with regard to the lip-synching
practice of Milli Vanilli, misattributive practices can lead to the creation of
very marketable illusions.333 To the extent trademark law requires honesty in
attribution, it may make those illusions less likely to occur. Does our society
profit from marketable illusions such as deathless and impossibly prolific
authors, photogenic singers with angelic voices, and Hollywood-forged mythic
political candidates? If people are willing to buy this stuff, isn’t that how we
should weigh social utility?
Perhaps society would actually be better off if Jeff Rovin and Andrew
Neiderman were forced to publish novels under their own names, if not all our
singers were photogenic, and if our system of politics was not so dependent on
speechwriters and the business of illusion. Would the unknown authors Rovin
and Neiderman be better off if trademark law cast a shadow on their respective
enterprises? Probably not, but for every penny spent on a book written by a
Neiderman or a Rovin, there are surely many other authors who are attempting
to capture the public attention, retracing the steps of the fictional Kathy Selden
in Singin’ in the Rain, believing that there is some truth to the story of her
success. This competition among artists and authors for our limited attention is
a zero-sum game. The shelf space devoted to the latest V.C. Andrews™
(Neiderman) and Tom Clancy™ (Rovin) books in my library is shelf space that
cannot be used by the lesser-known authors who actually write under their own
names.
The law can provide no complete panacea for the business practices and
marketing concerns that misallocate authorship. Even if trademark law can
come to the rescue to some limited degree, the costs and mechanics of
enforcement and the inherent difficulties in ascertaining the facts of authorship
might mean that ghostwriting and other misattributive practices would
continue largely unchecked. But it is justifiable to cast misattributive practices
under a legal shadow. Trademark law should not countenance intentional and
misleading public deception where it can serve as a remedy. Nor should our
intellectual property laws simply concentrate on the goal of production,
pumping out greater and greater quantities of expressive material for people to
“consume.” We should take account of the greater interests of society and the
goals of all of this productive activity.
As was demonstrated with the example of Michelangelo in Part I, the artistic
pursuit of quality, fueled by the desire to make a name for oneself and achieve
personal goals, is sometimes at odds with the pursuit of quantity.334
Trademark has a role to play in promoting quality by forcing each individual
332

See supra Part III.
See Wikipedia: Milli Vanilli, supra note 315.
334 VASARI, supra note 33, at 472 (describing how Michelangelo destroyed many of his
own works that did not meet his standards).
333
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author to stand on his or her own two feet and by discouraging practices where
one author claims undue credit for the authorship of others. The goals of
trademark align with social intuitions condemning plagiarism and popular
conceptions of what intellectual property law is designed to do.335 By restoring
the trademark function of authorship and prohibiting deceptive misattributions
of authorship that result in consumer harms, we might embrace what appears to
be an increasingly radical concept in intellectual property law. Trademark and
copyright are not simply laws intended to parcel out new private property
rights – they are laws that should be designed to promote and protect the
greater interests of society.

335

See Anonymous, supra note 65 (illustrating the moral condemnation of plagiarism).

